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Designing price contract and organization represents a constant chal-
lenge for researchers and managers. The aim of my thesis is to shed
some light on how to design eﬀective price contract and organization
by incorporating psychological realism. Departing from the standard
assumptions in neo-classical economics on consumers’ preferences
and beliefs, I adopted a pragmatic view towards understanding con-
sumer behavior. Specifically, consumers are boundedly rational with
time-inconsistent and other-regarding preferences.
Chapter 1. The first chapter examines the role of the sunk cost
fallacy as a self-commitment device and its implication for optimal
price contract design. Consumers evince the sunk cost fallacy if they
condition the consumption level on the sunk cost incurred in the past.
Our empirical study suggests that consumers are able to anticipate
the fallacy associated with the health club membership fee ex ante,
and hence they may rationally exploit this fallacy to counteract their
future self-control problem. Therefore, a firm’s optimal price contract
has to balance the demand for flexibility due to the sunk cost fallacy
and the demand for commitment due to the self-control problem.
Our analytical results show that in the market for investment goods
such as health club attendance, the sunk cost fallacy may increase
or decrease the consumer’s expected utility depending on the degree
of the self-control problem. In the market for leisure goods such
as video games, however, the consumer’s expected utility is always
decreasing with the sunk cost fallacy. In equilibrium, the firm can
internalize the behavioral biases, and the social welfare is independent
of the degree of the sunk-cost fallacy and the self-control problem. We
further extended our analysis to the market with price competition
and the market where the consumers are unaware of their self-control
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problems.
Chapter 2. Many voluntary organizations are formed by consumers
to restore social justice. Sanctioning organizations (like boycott
campaigns) subtract the wrong-doer’s well-beings, whereas subsidy
organizations (like charity foundations) increase the less well-oﬀ in-
dividual’s well-beings. These organizations restore social justice via
distinct mechanisms - ‘punish’ and ‘help’. We posit that a robust
mechanism that enforces distributive norms must accommodate het-
erogeneous (selfish or other-regarding) types of individuals and their
strategic interactions. To model such a mechanism, we combined
laboratory games with latent class modeling to characterize the ef-
fects of the interactions between social justice mechanisms and a
mixture of selfish and other-regarding types. Specifically, we investi-
gated a three-person, repeated game in which a third-party bystander
could monetarily help the victim or punish the norm-violator. We
found that a model that allows for a mixture of types explains choice
behavior significantly better than a representative agent model. Crit-
ically, we found that the superiority of the ‘punish’ condition in
enforcing norm-compliance depended on the norm-violator and the
third-party being other-regarding. In contrast, if either was selfish,
norm-enforcement under the ‘help’ condition was equal or superior
to that under the ‘punish’ condition. These results show that it is
crucial to know the proportion of diﬀerent types of individuals in the
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Chapter 1
Paying Enough to Go to the Gym
1.1 Introduction
Exercising self-control is diﬃcult. Consumers often fail to achieve the goals
they set because of the lack of self-control. As a result, consumers seek the
assistance of commitment device to help them behave more consistently with
the goals (Milkman, 2008; Bryan et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2014). They set
deadlines, make hard promises to others, and impose limit to their own credit
card. The demand for commitment device induces firms to modify their product
lines to address the consumers’ concern for the self-control problems. For instance,
manufacturers introduce small packaged cookies targeting the consumers who
want to restrict their future consumption (Wertenbroch, 1998; Jain, 2012). Banks
provide commitment saving account on which interest is forfeited if a monthly
deposit is not made on time (Ashraf et al., 2003, 2006).
In this paper, we focus on a potentially useful but understudied commitment
device – the sunk cost fallacy. Sunk cost is the cost that has already been
committed and is irreversible regardless of future action. Since sunk cost should
be irrelevant to decision-making, a violation of this principle, coined as the sunk
cost fallacy (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1990), is considered as irrational
behavior. Early research has shown that the sunk cost fallacy leads to suboptimal
decisions such as overconsumption (Just and Wansink, 2011) and escalation of
commitment in investment (Staw, 1981; Camerer and Weber, 1999).
1
Although it is a textbook example of irrational behavior in economics (Mankiw,
2011; Png, 2013), the American philosopher Robert Nozick noted the sunk cost
fallacy can serve as a technique to counteract self-control problem (Nozick, 1994).
He oﬀered the following example to illustrate his argument:
“If I think it would be good for me to see many plays or attend
many concerts this year, and I know that when the evening of the
performance arrives I frequently will not feel like rousing myself
at that moment to go out, then I can buy tickets to many of these
events in advance.... Since I will not want to waste the money I have
already spent on the tickets, I will attend more performances than I
would if I left the decisions about attendance to each evening."
In many situations, consumers have to pay a fixed upfront payment to access
the services and products, for instance, membership fee for the health club,
registration fee for a vocational training program, etc. The fixed fee is usually
non-refundable and independent of the future usage, representing one form of
sunk cost (Dick, 1995; Dick and Lord, 1998). In the market for investment goods,
one major problem that consumers are facing is the underconsumption problem
due to the lack of self-control. If a consumer incurred sunk cost in the past, the
presence of the sunk cost fallacy may increase the consumption level and hence
help the consumer achieve her long-term goal. In Nozick (1994)’s words, the
sunk cost fallacy “... can be rationally utilized to check and overcome another
irrationality (self-control problem)" 1.
From a firm’s perspective, there are several issues that are essential to understand.
First, do consumers anticipate that the fixed fee will increase the future consump-
tion level? If consumers can foresee the future sunk cost fallacy, they may want
1Some anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals may exploit their own future sunk cost
fallacy to exert more eﬀort in planned tasks. Steele (1996) and Walton (2002) recount stories of
individuals who buy expensive exercise machines or gym memberships reasoning that the high
cost will make them exercise more in the future. Salespeople are selling the outrageously priced
fitness machines and gym membership by exploiting the fallacy, too, because the consumers
believes that the sunk costs of buying the machines and membership will force them to exercise
frequently in the future (Miller, 2009).
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to exploit it in binding the future self from deviating from the long-term goal,
and the fixed fee should be adjusted according to the degree of the anticipated
sunk cost fallacy as well as self-control problem. Second, does sunk cost indeed
increase the consumption level? If so, the firm’s pricing decision on the fixed fee
will hinge on consumers’ willingness to purchase the product as well as the actual
consumption level. Third, how should a firm respond to these issues in designing
optimal price contract? When consumer evinces both self-control problem and
sunk cost fallacy, firm has to balance the demand for commitment (as a result of
the self-control problem) and the demand for flexibility (as a result of the sunk
cost fallacy) when making pricing decisions.
In the empirical part of the paper, we first experimentally test whether consumers
can forecast the future sunk cost fallacy. We found that the participants in
our laboratory study are aware that the membership fee they pay today will
be positively correlated with their frequency of health club attendance in the
future. We further test the existence of the sunk cost eﬀect on gym attendance
using a panel data set from health clubs (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006). By
exploiting the variation in sunk cost and usage over time, we found a significant
and positive impact of the sunk cost eﬀect on gym attendance. In sum, the
empirical results suggest that sunk cost fallacy is playing the role as a commitment
device, and the firm should take it into account in make pricing decisions.
We analyze the firm’s optimal price contract design when consumers exhibit both
the self-control problem and the sunk cost fallacy. We model consumer self-control
problem using the framework of time-inconsistent preference which captures the
conflicts between today’s preference, and the preference that will be held in
the future (Strotz, 1955; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). The
time-inconsistent preference is grounded on the substantial evidence that people
are hyperopic in evaluating long-run outcomes, but cannot resist immediate urges
and temptation, behaving myopically in the short run.
We find several interesting results. First, for the flat rate contract consisting of
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membership fee only, the sunk cost fallacy lowers the willingness to pay for the
membership fee if the consumer is time-consistent, whereas the sunk cost fallacy
increases the willingness to pay if the consumer is suﬃciently time-inconsistent.
Second, our analysis on two-part tariﬀ contract shows that the marginal price,
which is increasing with the sunk cost fallacy, should be charged higher than
the marginal cost to prevent overconsumption for the time-consistent consumers,
and should be charged lower than the marginal cost to induce more consumption
for the time-inconsistent consumers. In the equilibrium, the firm internalizes
the behavioral biases, and the welfare is independent of the degree of time-
inconsistency and the sunk-cost fallacy. At last, we show that the sunk cost
fallacy always decreases consumer’s welfare in the market for leisure goods, but
may increase the over-confident consumer’s welfare in the market for investment
goods.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, we review the
literature on commitment device, sunk cost fallacy, and behavioral contract
design. In section 1.3, we present the empirical results showing the possibility
that sunk cost can serve as the commitment device. In section 1.4, we setup the
analytical model, and show some preliminaries. In section 1.5, we analyze the
optimal contract design when the consumer evince both self-control and sunk cost
fallacy in the market for investment goods. The implication for social welfare is
also discussed. In section 1.6, we extend our model in the market for leisure goods
and the cases when a consumer does not have rational expectation regarding her
self-control problem and her sunk cost fallacy. In the last section, we highlight
the managerial and policy implications of our results, discuss limitations, and
identify directions for future research.
1.2 Literature Review
Bryan et al. (2010) defined the commitment device as “an arrangement entered
into by an agent who restricts his or her future choice set by making certain
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choices more expensive, perhaps infinitely expensive". The device will work
if the following conditions are met. First, the consumer is able to foresee the
self-control problem and consequences of her future action. Second, after the
device is triggered, it becomes costly to violate the goal. The cost can be economic
cost or psychological cost, or both. Third, the contingent plan conditional on
violation of the goal should be credible. The plan will be enforced as if there is a
faithful lawyer. The consumer cannot renegotiate the arrangement once it has
been set.
We believe that the sunk cost fallacy satisfies the conditions to serve as the
commitment device. First, as our laboratory experiment suggest, the consumer
can forecast that she will experience sunk cost fallacy. Thus, she knows the
consequence of the future action. Second, the consumer does not want the cost
incurred in the past to appear wasteful. When the consumer incurred cost but
forgoes the benefit, she will experience disutility (Thaler, 1990, 1999). As a result,
it is costly for the consumer not to carry on the action. Third, the sunk cost is
irreversible, and therefore the threat is credible.
As we discussed above, for the sunk cost to work as a commitment device, a
consumer should be able to forecast that she will experience the sunk cost fallacy.
If the fallacy only happens after the consumer incurs the sunk cost, the consumer
may be not aware that the sunk cost can serve as a self-disciplining tool ex
ante. Wang and Yang (2010) examined how the sunk-cost fallacy may aﬀect the
optimal two-part tariﬀ pricing in a neutral good case (Oi, 1971). In their model,
they assume the consumer only commits the sunk cost fallacy ex post. That is,
the consumer has diﬀerent demand function before and after signing the price
contract, but she is unaware of the diﬀerence and makes the decision based on
ex ante demand function. We believe the self-awareness of the future sunk cost
fallacy is an empirical question deserving tests.
The sunk cost fallacy has been empirically documented in the laboratory studies
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Gourville and Soman, 1998), but the evidence from
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field data are mixed. Camerer and Weber (1999), Just and Wansink (2011) and
Ho et al. (2014) documented the sunk cost eﬀect in escalation of commitment
in personnel decisions, dinning behavior and car usage, whereas in two other
field experiments (Ashraf et al., 2010; Cohen and Dupas, 2010), participants did
not exhibit the sunk cost fallacy in product usage. The general message from
this literature is that the existence of the sunk cost fallacy may depend on the
salience of the sunk cost and some specific contexts. In this paper, we use a field
panel data from health clubs to demonstrate that the usage of gym is higher
when the consumers incurred a higher sunk cost.
The paper also adds to the growing literature on designing pricing strategy for
boundedly rational consumers (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Lim and Ho,
2007; Ho and Zhang, 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Spiegler, 2011). In our paper, the
interaction between the consumer and the firm is modelled using DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004)’s framework. The model assumes that the consumer
is time-inconsistent, i.e., the instant preference disagrees with the long-term
preference. The firm is setting the optimal contract consisting of lump-sum fee
and per-visit fee. We depart from their model in the way that the lump-sum fee
will have the sunk cost eﬀect in the consumer’s consumption decision.
In DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), the firm oﬀers a higher fixed fee and a
lower per-usage fee in response to the self-control problem. The discounted per-
usage fee will ensure future consumption of the investment goods with lower cost,
and hence it is appealing to the consumer who is aware of her future self-control
problem and wants to maximize the future usage. In their model, the fixed fee
itself has no impact on the consumer’s usage. Our model explicitly builds the
sunk cost eﬀect into the consumer’s usage decision, and the fixed fee itself works
as a commitment device. In this respect, increasing fixed fee while lowering
per-usage fee may lead to overconsumption, which is not desirable for both the
consumer and the firm. The firm has to balance the demand for commitment
and flexibility.
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This paper is related to the large literature on self-control and demand for com-
mitment device in marketing (Wertenbroch, 1998; DellaVigna and Malmendier,
2004; Jain, 2009, 2012; Wansink and Huckabee, 2005). It is closely related to
Jain (2009) who investigated how consumers should set optimal goals to achieve
certain objectives in the presence of self-control problem. In his model, the
optimal goals endogenously arise because when a consumer does not achieve the
goal, she suﬀers negative emotions. In our model, the sunk cost fallacy operates
in a very similar way as the goal in driving eﬀort level, but the sunk cost – fixed
fee in our paper is a decision variable set by the firm in the price contract, i.e.,
exogenous to consumer.
1.3 Paying to Go to the Gym - Empirical Evidence
In many consumption occasions, a consumer has to incur some cost immediately
but receives the benefit in the future. There are plethora of examples: go to the
gym, write up the paper, visit to a doctor, save money for the rainy days. These
types of activities are often labelled as virtue goods consumption or investment
goods consumption. If the consumer has time-inconsistency, especially if the
consumer weighs the instant utility disproportionally higher than the long-run
utility, although the consumer prefers to consume the goods for the long-run
benefit, she is reluctant or procrastinates to do so. As a result, the self-control
problem causes underconsumption of investment goods.
Laboratory Study To demonstrate that the sunk cost fallacy is potentially
a commitment device which drives more investment goods consumption, we
conducted a pilot lab study to investigate whether people are aware that the sunk
cost will indeed increase their future consumption. 122 participants participated
in the experiments in exchange for course credits. They were asked:
Imagine that you plan to join a health club. The club has fully
equipped fitness facilities and state-of-the-art gymnasium, swimming
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pool, and relaxation areas to members. The membership fee per year
is $2500, but now they are having promotion for the membership.
You just need to pay $2000 ($1500/$500/$100) to join the club.
That is, you pay $500 ($1000/$2000/$2400) less than the usual
annual membership fee.
If you pay $2000 ($1500/$500/$100) membership fee and join the
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Figure 1.1: Forecasted Health Club Attendance
Note: There is a positive and significant correlation between price of the membership and
predicted attendance.
Each participant was presented the 4 discounted prices in a random order. They
were asked to choose: 1) less than 5 times a month; 2) 6-10 times a month; 3)
11-15 times a month; 4) 16-20 times a month; 5) 21-25 times a month; 6) Almost
every day. We include an original price for the membership fee is to prevent
subjects from making inference about the quality of the services. For the ease
of illustration, we use the average numbers of attendance for each option. For
instance, if the subject chose “2) 6-10 times a month;”, we interpret it as 8 times
a month. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, there is a positive correlation between
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price and anticipated attendance frequency. One factor ANOVA with repeated
measure returns significant eﬀect of membership fee on attendance frequency F (3,
363)= 14.11, p< .001. If the price were increased from $100 to $2000, participants
would forecast that they attend the gym 2 times more per month (t(121)=2.83,
p<.01).
The laboratory experiment demonstrates that people are aware that if they pay
more today, they anticipate that they will go to the health club more frequently
in the future. This is critical for sunk cost to work as the commitment device,
since if the sunk cost eﬀect can be anticipated, consumers can strategically use
it to increase (or decrease) future gym attendance. The high membership fee is
particularly favorable for the consumers who have great valuation of going to the
gym but expecting severe self-control problem.
We next examine whether the sunk cost indeed aﬀects the health club attendance
in the real world. We use the panel data from health clubs collected by DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2006). The price variation in the initiation fee and dynamics of
gym attendance allows us to identify the sunk cost eﬀect over time. The usage
over time under diﬀerent contract types (annual vs. monthly contract) further
enables us to control for novelty eﬀect after the consumers join the gym. By
exploiting these features of the data, we can estimate the impact of the sunk cost
- lump-sum membership fee on the future gym attendance, which helps us to
justify the assumptions that the sunk cost fallacy can be used as a commitment
device.
Our empirical study compliments a previous study conducted by Gourville and
Soman (1998) who also empirically studied the sunk cost fallacy in the health club
context. The authors tracked the monthly usage of gym members and found that
the attendance peaked at the month when the members paid their installment
and then declined gradually through the month just before the next scheduled
payment. Our empirical study compliments theirs in two aspects: first, their
study was based a rather small sample (N = 33), and our study enriched theirs
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with a larger sample size; second, there was no price variation in their study, and
therefore the magnitude of the sunk cost eﬀect was not econometrically identified.
1.3.1 Data
The panel dataset was collected from three health clubs in New England, US.
In the dataset, the consumers either chose the annual contract or the monthly
contract. Both types are flat-rate contract, i.e., once the consumers pay the
monthly or annual fee, the marginal price is zero. To join the club, the consumers
pay an initiation fee ranging from $0 to $150. The variation is due to the
promotion and corporate subsidies. The monthly contract charges a monthly fee
ranging from $70 to $85. The annual contract has an annual fee which is ten
times the applicable monthly fee, i.e., the users get two free months’ usage for a
yearly commitment. Corporate users (accounting for 53% of the sample) receive
subsidies from their company. The out-of-pocket fee by the corporate users varies
depending on the amount of subsidies they receive.
The dataset includes information on 10,175 individuals’ contractual choices
(annual vs. monthly contract), and their frequency of attendance at month level 2.
The sample covers the period from April 1997 through February 2001. To regulate
access, when the consumers enter the health club, their membership cards have to
be swiped by the club employees. This method allows the researchers to get high
precision on recording each member’s attendance 3. The billing system of the
clubs recorded detailed and accurate information about the contractual choices,
price paid for the transaction, and category of the users – standard, student,
family, corporate.
Similar to the way that DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) constructed their
2For more information on the dataset, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). The authors
generously made the dataset and the STATA code publicly available.
3Although we are unable to observe the real eﬀort level (like the duration in the gym, or
the intensity of exercise) that the consumer exerted in the gym, but we think the monthly
attendance may be a good proxy of the gym usage considering there is a fixed cost of traveling
to the gym, and the marginal cost of exercising is small after consumers enter the gym.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Length of Stay (Month) 18.82 10.94 1 47 97999
Initiation Fee 4.06 20.03 0 150 97999
Average Attendance Frequency 4.22 5.04 0 42 97999
Annual Contract (%) 14% 0.35 0 1 97999
Females (%) 44% 0.50 0 1 97863
Age 33.20 9.09 17 81 93750
Corporate Member (%) 53% 0.50 0 1 97999
Student Member (%) 2% 0.13 0 1 97999
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
sample, we eliminate 1,867 individuals who were never enrolled in any contract,
49 individuals with data inconsistency, 247 individuals with family membership,
and 260 individuals who had a free or a seasonal membership before. Thus,
we get a sample of 7,752 individuals. We focus on the first-time users of these
clubs and their enrollment spells. A spell starts whenever a consumer enrolls (or
reenrolls) in a club and ends whenever she quits or her membership expires. The
summary statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 1.1.
1.3.2 Model-free Evidence
If a consumer exhibits the sunk cost fallacy, we expect to observe the following
behavioral regularities in the data: i) the membership fee is positively correlated
with the frequency of health club attendance; ii) the sunk cost is more salient in
early stage of usage. After some periods, the eﬀect will depreciate with time or
will be oﬀset by accumulative usage. (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Gourville and
Soman, 1998; Thaler, 1999; Ho et al., 2014).
In our analysis, we consider the initiation fee instead of the membership fees
as the sunk cost to consumers because for the annual contract, the consumers
11
can pay the annual fee in three installments due in the first six months. One
limitation with the data is that we do not have information on when did the
consumers actually incurred the cost. The initiation fee, however, is paid up
front, which is an ideal case of sunk cost.
Although we do not know when consumers under the annual contract paid
their installments, we know that they completed the installment in the first six
months, and thus they paid a higher fees than the monthly users. We expect
that the annual members on average would attend the health club more in the
first half year than the monthly members. Figure 1.2 plots the average frequency
of attendance over time for annual and monthly members. It shows that the
frequency is declining over time for both types of members. Moreover, the annual
members had a higher frequency in the first eight months but lower frequency
in the last four months. Compared to annual members, monthly members have
to pay membership fee every month. It suggests that the larger membership
fee drives more attendance in the beginning, but after certain periods, the sunk
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Figure 1.2: Attendance Overtime
Note: Consumers initially had higher attendance frequency under annual contract than they
did under monthly contract, but later had lower attendance frequency.
Switchers We next examine the individuals who switched their contract from
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annual to monthly, or vice versa. There are 69 users who switched from monthly
to annual contract. If the consumer switches from monthly contract (with lower
flat fee) to annual contract (with a higher fee), her attendance frequency is
expected to increase. Investigating the switcher’s behavior may help us rule out
the alternative hypothesis that the correlation between fixed fee and attendance
is because of self-selection: the consumers who paid higher fee are the ones who
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Figure 1.3: Switcher’s Attendance
Note: The horizontal axis represents the average attendance frequency under monthly contract
(annual contract). The vertical axis represents the average attendance frequency under annual
contract (monthly contract). If the attendance frequency before switching and after switching
equal, the dots would fall along the 45 degree line. The fitted line from fractional polynomial
regression is also plotted with 95% confidence interval.
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In Figure 1.3 top panel, we present a scatter plot of the attendance frequency
under annual contract (y-axis) against the frequency under monthly contract. The
45 degree line represents the case where the consumer’s attendance frequency is
constant when she switches from monthly to annual contract. The top panel of the
plot shows that if the consumer underused the club, for instance, the attendance
is below 5 under the monthly contract, after switching, large proportion of
consumers increased their attendance. On the other hand, if the consumer used
the club frequently, the average attendance frequency slightly decreased. As
the figure shows, the line fitted by a fractional polynomial regression further
confirmed this hypothesis.
As a comparison, we plot the average attendance of 21 users switched from annual
to monthly contract (the lower panel of Figure 1.3). Contrast to the findings
for the users who switched from monthly to annual contract, we do not observe
a significant increase when the users underused the club when they were under
annual contract. The fitted regression line is very close to the 45 degree line.
These findings further support the hypothesis that the sunk cost eﬀect aﬀects
the attendance decisions.
1.3.3 Econometric Model
The model-free evidence we presented demonstrates that the sunk cost is positively
correlated with the health club attendance. The correlation is diminishing over
time. We next estimate the sunk cost eﬀect while controlling for the selection
problem. We assume that the attendance frequency is a function of individual’s
time-invariant characteristics, lump-sum fee paid (sunk cost eﬀect), the time
trend (novelty eﬀect). We propose the following linear regression model:
Qit = ↵Xi + ✓t +  t · Li + ci + ✏it (1.1)
Let Qit denote the attendance frequency for individual i at month t, vector Xi
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the time-invariant variables including the lump-sum fee Li paid by individual i,
✓t fixed eﬀect for each month capturing the time trend,  t the time varying sunk
cost eﬀect. From econometrician’s point of view, the error term consists of two
parts: ci + ✏it. ci is the unobserved heterogeneity which is potentially correlated
with the lump-sum fee Li. The unobserved heterogeneity causes the endogeneity
problem in estimating the sunk cost eﬀect. To identify sunk cost eﬀect, we have
the following conditional independence assumption:
E[✏it|ci, ✓t, Xi] = 0
Under this assumption, ✏it is a i.i.d idiosyncratic error conditional on the fixed
eﬀects. Since the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the time-invariant
variables, we adopt the standard fixed-eﬀect approach to eliminate the individual
specific eﬀect ci. Equation (1.1) can be re-written as:
Qi = ↵Xi · jT + ✓ · IT +   · Li · IT + ci · jT + ✏i (1.2)
jT is the T ⇥ 1 vector of ones. IT is the T ⇥ T matrix diag(1, 1, .., 1, 0), which
is the matrix of time-dummy variables. We use each individual’s last peiord as
the base period. The last row of IT is zero for identification purpose. ✓ and  
are vector of parameters (✓1, ✓2, ..., ✓T 1, 1) and ( 1,  2, ...,  T 1, 1), respectively.
✏i is the vector of (✏i1, ✏i2, ..., ✏iT ). We average equation (1.2) over t = 1, 2, ..., T
and obtain:
Q¯i = ↵Xi + ✓ · I¯T +   · Li · I¯T + ci + ✏¯i (1.3)
Taking the diﬀerence between equation (1.2) and equation (1.3) for each t gives
the fixed-eﬀect transformed equation (Wooldridge, 2010):
Qi   Q¯i = ✓ · (IT   I¯T ) +   · Li · (IT   I¯T ) + (✏it   ✏¯i)
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or
Q˜i = ✓ · I˜T +   · Li · I˜T + ✏˜i (1.4)
Since ci is eliminated, we are able to curtail the self-selection problem. Note that
in equation (1.4), we are unable to directly estimate the impact of Li since it is
cancelled out together with other time-invariant variables. We can only estimate
the diﬀerences in the partial eﬀects on Li relative to the base period. In our
estimation, we use the 12th month as the base period.
Results The estimation results are presented in Table 1.2. We present the results
from diﬀerent specifications. The first two models are OLS regression without
individual heterogeneity. The remaining models are dealing with individual
heterogeneity using the fixed eﬀect approach proposed above. In the model 6,
we consider a diﬀerent specification of the time trend. Instead of using time
dummies, we assume the trend is a quadratic function of the month: ✓1 · t+ ✓2 · t2.
As can be seen in Table 1.2, consistently there is significant and positive coeﬃcients
on the interaction between price and month in the first three months. The
coeﬃcients are diminishing over time. The results suggest that the sunk cost
does increase the frequency of the gym attendance, and the eﬀect is depreciating
with time. The pattern is robust while controlling for heterogeneity and diﬀerent
specifications of time trend.
The empirical analysis has two major findings. First, consumers are able to
anticipate the sunk cost fallacy associated with the membership fee. Hence,
the firm should take consumers’ anticipation into account when making pricing
decision on fixed fee. The strategic consumers can exploit the fallacy in increasing
future consumption level, which would aﬀect the willingness to pay for the lump-
sum membership fee. Second, consistent with extant literature on the sunk cost
fallacy, we found a significant and positive impact of the sunk cost eﬀect on gym
attendance. As a result, the fixed fee is correlated with the future operation
costs - more usage rate. The two findings suggest that the firm’s pricing decision
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on the fixed fee will influence the consumers’ future consumption level which
pertains to their willingness to purchase the product. In the remaining sections,
we investigate how a firm should respond to these issues in designing optimal
price contract.
1.4 Model Setup and Preliminaries
Timing of the Game. We consider a two-period model in which a consumer
interacts with a monopolistic health club. In period 0, the club oﬀers a two-part
tariﬀ contract (see Figure 1.4), consisting of lump-sum fee L, and per-visit fee p.
If the consumer rejects the oﬀer,the club receives zero profit, and the consumer
gets reservation utility u. If the consumer signs the contract, she has to pay
the lump-sum fee L at the beginning of t = 1. After signing the contract, the
consumer learns her private cost c of going to the gym 4, and then decides whether
to attend the gym (d 2 {0, 1}). If the consumer attends the gym (d = 1), she
pays p to the club, meanwhile incurs the cost c in t = 1, and receives benefit b in
t = 2. If she chooses not to go to the gym, her payoﬀ is dependent on the degree















Figure 1.4: Timing of the Game
We present our model in the health club context, but it is also implicated to
other domain of investment goods consumption. As we discussed in the previous
section, the key feature of this type of behavior is that the consumer incurs
immediate cost but receives benefit in the future. In our model, the consumer
4This setup is similar to Hayes (1987) and Png and Wang (2010) in modeling the demand
uncertainty: the actual cost is revealed to the consumer after the consumer subscribes the
contract.
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Model 1 Model 2 Mode 3 Mode 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 1 0.015*** 0.004 0.041*** 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 2 0.017*** 0.008* 0.042*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 3 0.011*** 0.007* 0.035*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 4 -0.001 -0.000 0.022*** 0.007* 0.008* 0.007*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 5 -0.004 -0.002 0.017*** 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 6 -0.003 0.000 0.016*** 0.007* 0.007 0.008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 7 -0.005 0.001 0.014*** 0.007* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 8 -0.001 0.004 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.011** 0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 9 -0.002 0.003 0.014*** 0.010** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 10 -0.004 0.001 0.010*** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sunk Cost Eﬀect on Month 11 -0.006 -0.001 0.007** 0.005* 0.009** 0.007**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control for Time Trend No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.001 0.015 0.005 0.074 0.082 0.074
N 64939 64939 64939 64939 31240 64939
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors presented in parentheses are
clustered at individual level. Model 1 and 2 are linear regression without controlling for
heterogeneity. Model 3-6 are fixed eﬀect models. Model 5 focuses on the non-corporate
members. Model 6 uses quadratic specification of time trend.
Table 1.2: Estimation of the Sunk Cost Eﬀect
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knows the distribution F (·) from which the costs c > 0 are drawn. She learns
the realization of c after she signs the contract.
1.4.1 Consumer
Consumer’s Intertemporal Preferences. To capture the self-control prob-
lem that a consumer faces, we assume that the consumer has quasi-hyperbolic
preference, which is a standard way of modelling dynamic inconsistency in the
literature (Strotz, 1955; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Jain, 2009, 2012). More
specifically, at any time t, the discount function equals 1 for the current period,
and equals   ,  2, ... for t + 1, t + 2, ... with 0     1. The extra discount
factor   causes “present bias": the discount factor between the present period
and the next period is   , while the discount factor between any two future
consecutive periods is  . The discrepancy between the immediate and the future
discount factor generates dynamic inconsistency 5. As a result, the consumer’s
decision problem can be interpreted as a sequential game between two selves with
divergent preference.
The quasi-hyperbolic discount function nests two special cases. An exponential
consumer has dynamic consistent preference (  = 1). A sophisticated consumer
has dynamic inconsistent preference ( ). Both types have rational expectations
on their discount function. In our paper, we mainly focus on the case when the
consumer has rational expectation, because the demand for commitment device
is based on the premise that the consumer is aware of her self-control problem.
We believe focusing on the rational expectation will help us better understand
the interplay between the self-control problem and the sunk cost fallacy 6.
5Thaler (1981) oﬀered an example to illustrate the idea of dynamic inconsistency: people
may be tempted to choose “Receiving one apple today" over “Two apples tomorrow", but they
would like to choose “Two apples in one year plus one day" over “One apple in one year". The
standard exponential discounting function cannot explain this “preference reversal" anomaly.
6In the literature, researchers also allow the consumer to have incorrect belief about their
dynamic consistency. This type of consumer, labeled as “naivete", has dynamic inconsistent
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In our context, consider at t = 0, the consumer thinks she will go to the gym
at t = 1 if   ( b  p  c)   0, which is c   b  p. At t = 1, the consumer will
actually go to the gym if   b  p  c   0, which is c    b  p. If   < 1, for the
consumers with   b  p < c <  b  p, attending the gym is desirable from the
perspective at t = 0, but undesirable from the perspective at t = 1, resulting in a
preference reversal.
Sunk Cost Eﬀect. There are several possible psychological mechanisms ex-
plaining the sunk cost eﬀect. Leading explanations include prospect theory
(risk-seeking in the loss domain and certainty eﬀect) (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Thaler, 1980), desire not to appear wasteful (Arkes and Blumer, 1985),
and need to justify a prior action (Staw, 1981). Recently, Baliga and Ely (2011)
argued that the sunk cost fallacy arises as a strategy for coping with limited
memory. In our paper, we attempt to build a tractable and parsimonious model
to capture the sunk cost fallacy caused by lump-sum fixed fee. Based on the
observation that sunk cost increases the consumption, we introduce the sunk
cost eﬀect in the likelihood of gym attendance. Recall that the likelihood of
gym attendance is c    b   p without sunk cost eﬀect. Now we assume that
c    b  p+  L.     0 is the parameter which captures the magnitude of the
sunk cost eﬀect. It reflects the impact of lump-sum fee L on the consumption
because F (  b  p+  L) > F (  b  p) 7. Another advantage of introducing the
sunk cost fallacy in the likelihood of gym attendance is that the sunk cost fallacy
is directly interacting with the realized cost c as well as the self-control problem
governed by  .
Therefore, the consumer’s expected utility from signing the contract is:
preferences (  < 1), but the belief about the inconsistency  ˆ is overoptimistic (0      ˆ  1).
We discuss the implication for naive consumer in the extensions.
7The potential underlying mechanism we are considering here is that the lump-sum fee paid
at t = 0 becomes a memory/perceptual cue for the consumer regarding the importance of the
activity. The strength of the cue depends both on how much the consumer paid L and the







( b  p  c) dF (c)
◆
(1.5)
If the consumer decides to sign the contract, she has to pay a lump-sum member-
ship fee L at the beginning of t = 1 8. With probability F (  b  p+  L), the
consumer will go to the gym and attain the net benefit  b  p  c. Note that the
consumer anticipates the time-inconsistency, and hence the probability of going
to the gym is aﬀected by  . Because the consumer is evaluating the contract
at t = 0, the membership fee and the expected net benefit are both discounted
by   . The distribution function F (c) is smooth, continuous, and diﬀerentiable,
with strictly positive density f(c). To examine the impact of sunk cost eﬀect,
the derivative of the consumer expected utility with respect to   is:
@E[Ut=0]
@ 
=   L[(1   ) b   L]f(  b  p+  L) (1.6)
Since f(·) is strictly positive, if the consumer is dynamic consistent (  = 1),
@E[Ut=0]
@  < 0 for L > 0 and   > 0, which implies that the exponential’s utility is
always decreasing with higher degree of the sunk cost fallacy. This is because
the exponential does not have self-control problem, and she will choose to attend
the gym at the ideal level. The sunk cost eﬀect will drive her to attend gym
even under the undesirable circumstances, and hence her utility is negatively
correlated with  .
On the other hand, if the discrepancy between the long-run and short-run pref-
erence is suﬃciently large, i.e.,   < 1   L b , the consumer’s utility is increasing
with the degree of sunk cost eﬀect  . This is reasonable since if the consumer
8Alternatively, the membership fee can be charged at t = 0. In that case, the person
experiences two stages involving present-bias: at t = 0, the consumer has to decide whether
to pay membership fee now and get the expected benefit from exercising later; at t = 1, if the
consumer join the health club, she has to decide whether to to the gym now and attain the
benefit later). The time-inconsistency at t = 0 will cause the consumer dislike the immediate
payment, and drive the firm to lower the membership fee and increase the per-visit fee. Our
focus is on the time-inconsistency for going to the gym for physical exercise. The assumption
that L is paid at t = 1 simplifies the analysis but does not aﬀect the results in a qualitative way.
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anticipates that she will have self-control problem, the sunk cost eﬀect will serve
as the commitment device, which increases the expected utility from a point of
view ex ante. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. For the consumer who is time-consistent (  = 1), her
expected utility is decreasing with the degree of the sunk cost eﬀect  . For the
consumer who has the self-control problem, if   < 1   L b , her expected utility is
increasing with the degree of the sunk cost fallacy.
We examine the impact of the sunk cost L. Note that if   = 0, the consumer’s
utility is strictly decreasing with L. The derivative of the consumer utility with
respect to L is:
@E[Ut=0]
@L
=    (  ((1   )b   L) f( b  p+  L)  1) (1.7)
If the consumer is dynamic consistent (  = 1), then @E[Ut=0]@L < 0, which implies
that the exponential’s utility is always decreasing with higher lump-sum fee,
irrespective of the degree of the sunk cost fallacy. Again, this is because for the
exponential, she attends the gym at the first best level. Hence, sunk cost does
not provide any benefits. When   < 1, the consumer’s utility is not a monotonic









@L > 0 for   > 0
9.
1.5 Contract Design
The firm gains expected profit E[⇧t=0] from charging lump-sum fixed fee L and
per-visit fee p if the consumer signs the contract. If the consumer uses the gym,
the firm incurs a marginal cost a. In the monopolistic market, the firm maximizes
its profits subject to the consumer’s participation constraint. Similar to other
9For instance, let c ⇠ U [0, 1]. If   <  b  2L 1 b , then @E[Ut=0]@L > 0.
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previous research in the literature (Jain, 2012; Spiegler, 2011; DellaVigna and
Malmendier, 2004), we assume the firm has an exponential discount function.



















We first consider a very special contract type – flat-rate contract {L > 0, p = 0}.
That is, the consumer only needs to pay a lump-sum membership fee, and does
not need to pay additional per-visit fee when she uses the gym. This type of
contract is widely observed in the health club industry (see DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006)). The firm chooses the optimal L to maximize the profits.
To obtain closed-form solution, we assume c ⇠ U [0, 1] and 0  b  1. The
simplification still keeps the randomness in private cost of using the gym. To
simplify the exposition but without loss of generality, we assume   = 1 (see
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); Jain (2009, 2012)).
We investigate optimal membership fee with and without presence of sunk cost
eﬀect, denoted by Lsc and Lnsc, respectively. Since it is a monopolistic firm, the
membership fee will be charged such that E[Ut=0] = 0. We assume u = 0. Two
types of consumers are examined: the dynamic consistent (exponential (e)) and
dynamic inconsistent consumer (sophisticate (s)). The proposition on optimal
membership fee follows (proof can be found in the mathematical appendix):
PROPOSITION 2. (i) For the time-consistent consumer, the presence of sunk
cost eﬀect lowers the willingness to pay for the membership fee, i.e., Lesc  Lensc,




1 + 4 2b2 ,
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the presence of the sunk cost fallacy increases the consumer’s willingness to pay,
i.e., Lssc > Lsnsc;
The results correspond to the analysis in section 1.4.1. The time-consistent
consumer does not want their future behavior constrained by the sunk cost
fallacy, since the fallacy will drive the consumer to go to gym in undesirable
cases (when attendance cost c is high), resulting in lower benefit from using the
gym. On the other hand, for the time-inconsistent consumer, the sunk cost eﬀect
provides a commitment device, which makes the future behavior consistent with
the long-run self.
The welfare implication of the above analysis is interesting: the flat-rate contract
is an ineﬃcient design for the time-consistent consumers, and it lowers the social
welfare. For the time-inconsistent consumers, the sunk cost fallacy associated
with flat-rate contract may increase the willingness to pay for the contract, and
hence increases the social welfare.
To better understand the interaction between self-control and the sunk cost
fallacy, we contrast the willingness to pay (WTP) between the case when sunk
cost eﬀect is present and the case when it is absent (see Figure 1.5). We set
b = 0.85 and varied   and   from 0 to 1. The positive region denotes the case
when the consumer has a higher WTP relative to the benchmark case when she
does not have the sunk cost fallacy (  = 0). As can be seen, the sunk cost fallacy
increases WTP when the consumer is suﬃciently time-inconsistent. But the
positive region shrinks as the degree of sunk cost eﬀect becomes larger and larger.
The upper-right region shows the cases whereby the negative impact of the sunk
cost fallacy surpasses its positive impact in counteracting self-control problem,
and hence the WTP is lower than the case when there is no sunk cost fallacy.
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Figure 1.5: WTP Relative to Benchmark Model (  = 0)
Note: The darker the region is, the higher WTP relative to benchmark model assuming   = 0.
Negative region indicates that the WTP considering the sunk cost fallacy is lower than the
WTP when   = 0. In the plot, we set b = 0.85.
Recall the findings in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) that the consumers
overpaid for the flat-rate contract. Our framework can “rationalize" their findings.
The sophisticated consumer has a higher evaluation for the flat-rate contract
since it will induce her to attend the gym more frequently compared to the same
money paid under the pay-per-visit contract. The willingness to pay for the
flat-rate contract is higher if she has higher degree of time-inconsistency.
1.5.2 Two-Part Tariﬀ Contract
Optimal Pricing Contract. We now examine the case when the firm can
use both lump-sum fee L and per-visit fee p as instruments. Before we analyse
the price contract for the consumer with both the self-control problem and the
sunk cost fallacy, we first show the benchmark model where the consumer is
time-consistent and does not have a sunk cost fallacy (i.e.,   = 1 and   = 0).
We will use the price contract under the benchmark model to compare with
the model where consumers exhibits biases. We define the welfare under the
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benchmark model as the first best level.
To make the model tractable, we maintain the same simplifications in the previous
section. That is,   = 1, c ⇠ U [0, 1] and 0  b  1. We define the firm’s expected
profits at t = 0 as E[⇧t=0], and the consumer’s expected utility as E[Ut=0]. In
the monopolistic market, the firm extracts all the consumer’s surplus. Hence,
the total social welfare E[Wt=0] = E[⇧t=0] +E[Ut=0] = E[⇧t=0] 10. We solve the
program (1.8) while restricting   = 1,   = 0, and the lemma follows:
LEMMA 1. (i) If the consumer is time-consistent and does not have the sunk
cost fallacy, the optimal price contract is:
8>><>>:
L⇤ = 12(b  a)2
p⇤ = a
(1.9)
(ii) In the equilibrium, the probability that the consumer will attend the gym is
F (b  a) = b  a. (iii) The firm profits as well as the social welfare is 12(b  a)2.
Lemma 1 shows that when the consumer is time-consistent and her decision is
not dependent on sunk cost, the per-visit fee is equal to the marginal cost. The
firm extracts all the social surplus via membership fee.
LEMMA 2. (i) If the consumer exhibits time-inconsistency (0     1) but
without the sunk cost fallacy (  = 0), the optimal contract is:
8>><>>:
L⇤ = 12(b  a) (b(3  2 )  a)
p⇤ = a  (1   )b
(1.10)
(ii) In the equilibrium, the probability that the consumer will attend the gym is
F (b  a) = b  a. (iii) The firm profits as well as the social welfare is 12(b  a)2.
10Consistent with the literature, the welfare measure in our paper is from a “long-run
perspective", i.e., the expected utility at t = 0 for the exponentials and sophisticates.
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Comparing lemma 1 and lemma 2, we notice that the contract in equation (1.9)
is the special case of the contract in equation (1.10). The presence of time-
inconsistency increases the lump-sum fee and drives the marginal price below the
marginal cost. Interestingly, the probability of gym attendance and profit are
independent of the degree of time-inconsistency  . Using two-part tariﬀ, the firm
is able to achieve the profit level as if the time-inconsistency is absent.
When 0    < 1,   > 0, the firm has to consider how to use both membership
fee and per-visit fee to extract the most profits. We derive the full model and
compare with the results from the benchmark model. Under the general pricing
contract, the optimal strategy for the firm is stated in the following proposition
(The proof is in the appendix):
















@  < 0, and
@p⇤
@  > 0. (iii) If   is suﬃciently large (for instance,   = 1) or   >
2b(1  )
(b a)2 , the
unit price p⇤ is higher than the marginal operational cost a.
As in proposition 3, the comparative static shows that the optimal membership
fee is decreasing with degree of sunk cost eﬀect for all spectrum of  . For
the time-consistent consumer   = 1, the lowered membership fee will give the
consumer more flexibility to choose whether to go to the gym in the future; On
the other hand, for the time-inconsistent consumer   < 1, higher degree of sunk
cost eﬀect given the same level of membership fee can oﬀer higher commitment
power for attending the gym in the future, and hence the gym can lower the
membership fee to increase the attractiveness of the contract.
The partial derivative of the per-visit fee with respect to the degree of sunk cost
eﬀect is positive, indicating that the firm charges higher per-visit fee for the
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consumer regardless of their time preference. For the time-consistent consumer, if
she has higher degree of sunk cost eﬀect, the high per-visit fee can prevent them
going to the gym when it is not desirable. For the time-inconsistent consumer,
higher degree of sunk cost eﬀect makes the sunk cost eﬀect looms larger, and
drives the consumer more likely to go to the gym even with a higher per-visit fee.
In sum, the higher degree of sunk cost eﬀect leads the firm to attain less profits
from the membership fee but more profits from the per-visit fee.
Figure 1.6: Contrast Between Marginal Price and Marginal Cost (b = 0.85,
a = 0.2)
Note: The darker the region is, the higher the marginal price (MP) relative to the marginal
cost (MC). The plot shows that if the consumer is time-consistent and has low degree of the
sunk cost fallacy, the marginal price should be charged lower than the marginal cost. If the
consumer is relatively time-consistent and has high degree of the sunk cost fallacy, the marginal
price should be charged higher than the marginal cost.
In Figure 1.6, we plot the contrast between marginal price (p⇤) and marginal
cost (a) in response to the consumer’s degree of time-inconsistency and the sunk
cost fallacy. Interestingly, the marginal price is increasing with   and  . As the
figure shows, there are three regions on the temperature map. The region on
the left-hand side displays that the optimal marginal price is higher than the
marginal cost. This is the region where the consumer has high degree of the
sunk cost fallacy, but lower degree of self-control problem. High per-visit fee is
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to prevent consumer from overconsuming. As we move to the left, the marginal
price becomes lower and lower, which is because the lower marginal price will
incentivise more attendance for the consumer with self-control problem.
We have similar findings to DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) that @L⇤@  < 0,
and @p
⇤
@  > 0. If the consumer has self-control problem, the contract with lower
per-visit fee is more attractive, which makes the consumer more willing to attend
the gym. Hence the firm charges lower per-visit fee but higher membership fee.
As shown in Figure 1.6, if the consumer’s self-control problem is severe enough,
the firm may want to oﬀer negative per-visit price. We also notice that the cross
partial derivatives @2L⇤@ @  > 0 and
@2p⇤
@ @  < 0.
Welfare Analysis in the Monopolistic Market. In the model, we assume a
monopolistic market where the firm extracts all the consumer’s surplus. Hence,
the total social welfare is measured by the firm’s profits. We now examine
the firm’s profits in equilibrium. First, we observe that consumer’s expected
consumption is unaﬀected by the sunk cost eﬀect in equilibrium. The consumer
will consume if c   b  p⇤ +  L⇤. If we plug the equilibrium contract (equation
(1.11)) in the inequality, we obtain c  b  a, which is the same as the case when
there is no time-inconsistency and no sunk cost eﬀect.
We next examine the firm’s profit. We plug the equilibrium contract (equation




(p⇤   a) dF (c) = 1
2
(b  a)2
Since in equilibrium, consumer receives zero payoﬀ. As a result, the sunk cost
eﬀect does not aﬀect social welfare in equilibrium. We state the results in the
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. In the equilibrium, the consumer’s likelihood of attending
gym and the firm’s profits are independent of the self-control problem   and the
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sunk cost eﬀect  .
We notice that 12(b  a)2 is also first best social welfare level, which is achieved
when the consumer does not have self-control problem and sunk cost eﬀect. This
is somewhat surprising. If both the firm and the consumer are strategic and
have rational expectation, the interaction eliminate the behavioral biases in the
equilibrium because the firm internalizes the biases in the price structure.
What if the firm sets the price contract without considering the sunk cost
fallacy? Suppose the firm deviates from the optimal contract and sets a new
contract {L0, p0} as in equation (1.10). The lump-fee L0 is higher than the
equilibrium L⇤, and hence it results in higher likelihood of gym attendance
F (b a+ [(b a)(b(3 2 ) a)]) > F (b a). But the gained benefit from going
to the gym net alternative per-visit price p0 is not suﬃcient in compensating the
higher lump-sum fee paid. As a result, the consumer’s utility under the price
contract {L0, p0} is negative. Meanwhile, the firm does not attain its best profit
level. Hence, there will be loss in social welfare if the price contract does not
incorporate the sunk cost fallacy.
Perfect Competition. We now examine how competition would influence the
firm’s pricing strategy. We assume that firms are homogeneous and there is no
switching cost for the consumers. Since the firms are competing only in price
dimension, in a perfect competition equilibrium, the firms earns zero profits.

















Solving the program, we find the unique optimal pricing contract. We state the
optimal contract and its implication for social welfare formally in the following
proposition (see appendix for the proof). Since the consumer extracts all the so-
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cial surplus in a perfect competition market, the total social welfare is equivalent
to the consumer surplus E[Wt=0] = E[⇧t=0] + E[Ut=0] = E[Ut=0].
PROPOSITION 5. (i) In the market with perfect competition, the optimal








@  < 0, and
@p⇤
@  > 0. (iii) Both L
⇤ and p⇤ under perfect competition is lower than that under
monopoly. p⇤ should be charged always below the marginal cost a.
Proposition 5 shows that under perfect competition, the sunk cost eﬀect has a
negative impact on the membership fee L⇤ and positive impact on per-visit fee
p⇤, a similar finding compared to the case under monopolistic market. The social
surplus is transferred to consumer by both lowered membership fee and per-visit
fee.
Welfare Analysis in the Market with Perfect Competition. In the model,
we assume a market with perfect competition where the consumer extracts all
the social surplus. Hence, the total social welfare is measured by the consumer’s
welfare. We now examine the consumer’s welfare in the equilibrium. First, we
observe that the consumer’s expected consumption is not aﬀected by the sunk
cost eﬀect nor the self-control problem in equilibrium. The consumer will go
to the gym if c   b  p⇤ +  L⇤. If we plug the equilibrium contract (equation
(1.12)) in the inequality, we obtain c  b  a, which is the same as the case under
monopolistic market. We can easily verify that the equilibrium consumer welfare
is 12(b  a)2, which is the same as the one in monopolistic market. Hence we have
the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 6. Under perfect competition, the consumer’s likelihood of
attending gym and the social welfare are the same as those under monopolistic
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market, and are independent of the self-control problem   and the sunk cost eﬀect
  in the equilibrium.
In sum, our analysis shows that the presence of the sunk cost fallacy leads to
lowered lump-sum fee and increased per-visit fee in the market for investment
goods. The behavioral biases about the sunk cost fallacy and self-control are
internalized by the firm in the price structure, and hence the welfare in the equi-
librium dose not depend on the behavioral biases. These findings are replicated
in the perfect competition environment.
1.6 Extensions
In the previous section, we examined the optimal price contract for investment
goods when the consumer is time-inconsistent and has the sunk cost fallacy.
In this section, we first extend the analysis to pricing for leisure goods. The
consumption of leisure goods yields an instant positive payoﬀ but delayed cost
in the future. Secondly, we relax the assumption of rational expectation, and
examine the case where a consumer overestimates her self-control or her sunk
cost fallacy.
1.6.1 Pricing for Leisure Goods
In this section, we extend the analysis to pricing for the goods involving immediate
benefits and delayed cost. This type of goods such as dinning, gambling, credit
card subscription, smoking, etc., is often labeled as leisure goods or vice goods.
The interaction between the sunk cost and the self-control problem in leisure
goods consumption was demonstrated in a field experiment (Just and Wansink,
2011). The authors found that higher fixed fee paid in a buﬀet restaurant leads
to more food consumption.
Interestingly, to prevent people from entering the casinos, Singapore government
imposed a daily entry levy of $100 (⇠ $80 USD) and annual entry levy of $2,000
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(⇠$1600 USD) on Singaporeans and permanent residents seeking to enter the
casinos. The introduction of levy fee is controversial. It raises the concern that
this policy may lead to more problematic gambling behavior because once the
entry fee was paid, the consumer may feel they should play more due to the sunk
cost incurred. In contrast to the consumption of investment goods, the presence
of the sunk cost fallacy may intensify the overconsumption problem together with
the self-control problem. Another issue is how the casino firms should respond to
the regulation.
To simplify our exposition, we use the same set of notations as in the analysis for
investment goods but flip the sign. We assume  c ⇠ U [0, 1] and  1  b < 0. Un-
der the new assumption, the consumer chooses to consume the goods, she receives
a stochastic benefit  c at t = 1, and incurs a deterministic cost b at t = 2. As a
result, the probability of consumption from the perspective of t = 0 is F (b  p),
but at t = 1, the probability becomes F ( b p). Notice that F ( b p) > F (b p),
i.e., the time-inconsistency results in overconsumption. If the consumer incurred
sunk cost in the past and she has the sunk cost fallacy, the fallacy will further
increase the probability of consumption because F ( b  p+  L) > F ( b  p).
COROLLARY 1. The consumer’s expected utility is decreasing with the degree
of sunk cost eﬀect   and the sunk cost L.
Recall equation (1.6) and (1.7) in the beginning of the model setup, since f(·)
is strictly positive and b < 0, if L   0, then @E[Ut=0]@  < 0 and @E[Ut=0]@L < 0. It
shows that for all types of consumers, the degree of sunk cost eﬀect and the
sunk cost have a negative impact on the consumer’s expected utility. It leads to
overconsumption for the leisure goods.
The main purpose of charging entry levy is to deter Singaporeans from entering
the casino (screening eﬀect). Since the entry levy decreases the expected utility,
it makes attending the casino further less attractive, and hence amplify the
screening eﬀect. Nevertheless, the entry levy may have downside eﬀect on the
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entrants who may not aware of the sunk cost eﬀect. From a consumer welfare
point of view, it may not be advisable to charge the entry levy when welfare loss
from unawareness is larger than the gain from screen eﬀect.
Since we use the same system of notations and simply flip the sign, we can
re-interpret proposition 3 as:
















@  > 0, and
@p⇤
@  < 0. (iii) The marginal price p
⇤ is always higher than the marginal operational
cost a
The comparative static analysis in corollary 2 shows that the optimal lump-sum
fee and per-visit fee are both increasing with the degree of sunk cost eﬀect  .




@  , which indicates that the sunk cost eﬀect has larger
positive impact on per-visit fee than on lump-sum fee. The higher per-visit fee
serves as a commitment device in reducing the chance of consumption. The
lump-sum fee is increasing with   because higher lump-sum fee can induce more
consumption in the future, the negative impact of the sunk cost is mitigated by
the higher per-visit fee.
The analysis shows that although the consumer’s expected utility is decreasing
with the sunk cost eﬀect, the per-visit fee can serve as the counterpower to curtail
the eﬀect. If we reconsider the levy fee introduced by Singapore regulators, the
firm may increase the marginal price conditional on consumption level and hence
prevent the consumer from overconsumption. In such case, higher marginal cost
for consumers actually increase the attractiveness of the whole contract.
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1.6.2 Overestimating Self-Control
Our previous analysis are based on the assumption that the consumer has rational
expectation of the future self-control problem. The consumer may not be fully
aware of her time-inconsistency, and especially the consumer may underestimate
the self-control problem she faces in the future. This over-optimistic consumer
is labelled as “partially naive" type (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Jain,
2009, 2012). At t = 0, the consumer overestimates the time-consistency. She
forecasts the degree of present bias  ˆ    , and she believes that she will attend
the gym if  ˆb  p  c   0. As early research noted (DellaVigna and Malmendier,
2004), the mismatch between predicted and actual likelihood of attending the
gym, F ( ˆb  p)  F ( b  p)   0 is a measure of overconfidence.
Overconfidence about self-control causes a discrepancy between the predicted
expected utility and actual expected utility for the partially naive consumer. The
predicted expected utility is denoted as E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )], and the actual expected
utility is E[U(L, p, ,  )]. We examine that given the pricing contract, how the
sunk cost eﬀect will influence the prediction error – the diﬀerence between the
predicted and actual expected utility. Analysis on the prediction errors will help
us to understand when the firm can exploit the error without the consumer’s
awareness ex ante.
We consider two types of prediction errors. The consumer will have false-optimistic
error if E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] > E[U(L, p, ,  )]. This type of error occurs when the
consumer is over-optimistic about the potential utility she can obtain given her
belief. The optimism leads to welfare loss since the consumer has higher willing-
ness to pay than she should have, and the firm can exploit the error by charging
higher price without providing more services. false-pessimistic error would occur
if E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] < E[U(L, p, ,  )]. In such case, the misprediction about the
self-control leads to over-pessimistic view on the expected utility. Over-pessimism
results in lower willingness to pay ex ante, and may force firm to lower the price.
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PROPOSITION 7. In the market for investment goods, (i) if  ˆ =  , E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] =
E[U(L, p, ,  )]; (ii) if  ˆ >  , and   < b(2  ˆ  )2L , then false-optimistic error will
occur, i.e., E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] > E[U(L, p, ,  )]; (iii) if  ˆ >  , and     b(2  ˆ  )2L ,
then false-pessimistic error will occur, i.e., E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )]  E[U(L, p, ,  )];
Proposition 7 shows that in the market for investment goods, if the degree of the
sunk cost eﬀect is small, the consumer will receive less utility than she expects.
This is simply because the consumer erroneously believes that she will attend the
gym with certain likelihood, but the realized discount factor is smaller than she
thoughts  ˆ >  , and she is less motivated to go to the gym given the discounted
benefit and insuﬃcient sunk cost eﬀect.
Interestingly, if the consumer has suﬃciently high degree of sunk cost eﬀect,
false-pessimistic error occurs: the actual expected utility is higher than the one
she subjectively believes. As we discussed earlier, she think she will behave as the
time-consistent consumers and underestimate the need for commitment device
in the future. As the sunk cost fallacy looms larger, at t = 0 she believes that
she will have less and less flexibility at t = 1, and hence anticipates that she
may have to go to the gym under undesirable cases, resulting a lower expected
utility. However, at t = 1, the sunk cost eﬀect counteracts the realized self-control
problem, and the detrimental eﬀect is oﬀset by the motivating eﬀect.
In Figure 1.7, we plot the diﬀerence between the predicted expected utility and
the actual expected utility. We set  ˆ = 1, i.e., the consumer is fully naive. As
the previous plot, we set b = 0.85. For illustration purpose, we set L = 0.5
which is smaller than the benefit b. The plot shows that if the consumer has
suﬃciently high degree of the sunk cost fallacy, the consumer will always receive
higher utility than she predicted except the knife-edge case that  ˆ =  . If the
discrepancy between the predicted discount factor  ˆ = 1 and the actual discount
factor   is larger while the sunk cost eﬀect is small, the consumer will receive
less than what she predicted.
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Figure 1.7: Contrast Between the Predicted Expected Utility and the Actual
Expected Utility
Note: The darker the region is, the higher the predicted expected utility relative to the actual
expected utility. In the plot, we set  ˆ = 1, b = 0.85 and L = 0.5
The analysis above implies that in the market for investment goods, the sunk cost
eﬀect mitigates the welfare loss due to the over-confidence. In certain conditions,
the consumer may obtain higher utility than she predicted. We next consider
the implication for the market for leisure goods. Similar to the assumption in
the previous section, consumer enjoys the benefit  c ⇠ U [0, 1] first, and cost
 1  b < 0 is delayed. We have the following corollary:
COROLLARY 3. In the market for leisure goods, if  ˆ >  , the consumer’s
actual expected utility is always lower than the predicted expected utility (false-
optimistic error), and the prediction error looms larger with higher degree of sunk
cost eﬀect.
The consumer has rational expectation about the sunk cost fallacy, and is able
to forecast that the sunk cost fallacy will increase the future consumption level.
But the sunk cost eﬀect exacerbates the mis-prediction problem. As a result, in
the market for vice goods, the overconfident consumer can never benefit from
the sunk cost eﬀect. On contrary, she would suﬀer more if she has higher degree
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of the sunk cost fallacy because the sunk cost fallacy reinforces the detrimental
eﬀect caused by self-control, and the consumer would end up with even lower
expected utility.
1.6.3 Overestimating the Sunk Cost Fallacy
In this section, we examine how overestimation on the sunk cost fallacy will aﬀect
consumer’s prediction errors on utility. Consumer may overestimate the sunk cost
fallacy if consumer has limited memory about the past expenditure. Although
consumer anticipates that the sunk cost will increase the future consumption as
shown in our pilot study, she may forget about how much they paid, or she may
feel less guilty about not attending the gym than she thought before.
Similarly, the false belief about the sunk cost fallacy causes a discrepancy be-
tween the predicted expected utility and actual expected utility. The predicted
expected utility is denoted as E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)], and the actual expected utility is
E[U(L, p, ,  ].  ˆ is the estimated sunk cost fallacy, and  ˆ    . We examine that
given the pricing contract, how time-inconsistency   will influence the prediction
error – the diﬀerence between the predicted and actual expected utility. Firm can
exploit the error without the consumer’s awareness ex ante. We again consider
two types of prediction errors. The consumer will have false-optimistic error if
E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] > E[U(L, p, ,  )]; the consumer will commit false-pessimistic
error if E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] < E[U(L, p, ,  )]. In such case, the misprediction about
the sunk cost fallacy leads to over-pessimistic view on the expected utility. Over-
pessimism will result in lower willingness to pay.
PROPOSITION 8. In the market for investment goods, (i) if  ˆ =  , E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] =
E[U(L, p, ,  )]; (ii) if  ˆ >  , and   < 1   L( ˆ+ )2 , then false-optimistic er-
ror would occur, i.e., E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] > E[U(L, p, ,  )]; (iii) if  ˆ >  , and
  > 1  L( ˆ+ )2 , then false-pessimistic error would occur, i.e., E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] <
E[U(L, p, ,  )];
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Proposition 8 shows that when the consumer overestimates the sunk cost fallacy,
she will receive less utility than she anticipated if she has severe self-control
problem. When the consumer is time-consistent, overestimation on the sunk cost
fallacy will cause the consumer receive more utility than she anticipated. We
next examine the implication for leisure goods and the corollary follows:
COROLLARY 4. In the market for leisure goods, if  ˆ >  , the consumer’s
actual expected utility is always higher than the predicted expected utility (false-
pessimistic error), and the prediction error looms larger with higher degree of
self-control problem.
When  ˆ >  , overcomsumption problem caused by the sunk cost fallacy is more
server than it actually is, and hence the consumer overestimates the negative
impact of the sunk cost fallacy and commits the false-pessimistic error. As the
consumer’s self-control problem becomes more severe, she will anticipate that the
sunk cost fallacy (in false belief) will exacerbate the self-control problem. As a
result, she has a rather pessimistic view about her utility as   becomes smaller.
1.7 Discussion
The sunk cost fallacy is a canonical example of irrational behavior. It results
in overconsumption, escalation of commitment in investment, and insuﬃcient
adaptation to new situations. In this paper, we investigated the implication
for the market for investment goods in which consumers often face self-control
problems. We showed that the sunk cost fallacy can mitigate the discrepancy
between “should" and “want", and can potentially serve as a commitment device
to counteract the self-control problem. Although we use health club industry as
a running example, our analysis and results are also implicated to the pricing
issues in other industry, such as vocational training, credit card, casino, etc.
In sum, our paper experimentally demonstrates that the consumer is able to
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anticipate that she would go to the gym more frequently in the future if she pays
higher membership fee. Using a field data collected from health clubs, we show
that consistent with the sunk cost fallacy hypothesis, the membership fee does
lead to higher attendance rate. These two empirical findings support the notion
that the consumer can leverage the membership fee as the commitment device,
and increase the consumption of virtue goods.
We analyse the design of optimal price contract when the self-control problem is
the major concern for consumers. It has significant managerial implication for
firm’s pricing decision since the firm has to balance the demand for commitment
device and demand for flexibility. We found that in the case where firm charges
only membership fee, the consumer has higher willingness to pay only when her
self-control problem is suﬃciently severe. When firm charges two-part tariﬀ,
the firm can increase the per-visit fee. When the consumer is suﬃciently time-
consistent, the per-visit fee is higher than the marginal cost. We also discussed
the implication for vice goods pricing. The fixed fee lowers the expected utility,
but interestingly the firm can also increase the per-visit fee which may help
consumer reduce the consumption. In the vice goods case, the per-visit fee is
always higher than the marginal price.
The role of sunk cost as a commitment device also explains the major findings
in the paper “Paying to not to go to the gym" by DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2006) 11. The authors found that the consumers pay $70 monthly membership
and on average attend the gym 4.8 times a month, resulting in $17 per visit.
On the other hand, the gym oﬀers pay-per-visit contract that cost only $10
per-visit. We provide an alternative explanation that if the consumer is aware
of her self-control problem and sunk cost fallacy, choosing the flat-rate contract
with up front fixed fee can induce more future usage. Our explanation does not
rely on the assumption of incorrect belief. Our findings partially explain the
flat-rate bias found by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006).
11It is not a coincidence that our paper is titled “Paying enough to go to the gym".
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Enriched by the psychological and sociological realism in modelling consumer
behavior, the modified model has better predictive power than standard economic
models. It is partially the reason why behavioral economics is gaining more and
more attention in policy making. Our analysis has implication for why subsidizing
enrollment in health club has small eﬀects on obesity (Cutler et al., 2003). The
subsidies may increase the likelihood of join the health club, but the consumers
may have less motivation to go to the gym since the sunk cost fallacy is switched
oﬀ. On the other hand, the fixed fee exacerbates the overconsumption problem
for leisure goods. In the casino industry, the introduction of entry levy may make
the going to the casino even less attractive because the consumer expects that
she will gamble more given the sunk cost.
The limitation of our paper is three fold and it allows room for future explorations.
First, in our model, we assume a representative consumer who is either time-
consistent or time-inconsistent. The firm therefore is oﬀering one type of price
contract to the consumer. In reality, however, there exist multiple types of
consumers who diﬀer in the degree of the time inconsistency, the sunk cost fallacy,
and the ability in predicting their future preference. The firm is better to provide
a menu of contracts which can “screen" the consumer according to their types
(Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006). Thus it would be interesting to examine the optimal
contract menu in the presence of heterogeneity.
Second, we model the sunk cost eﬀect in our model by capturing the increased the
likelihood of going to the gym, and the likelihood is dependent on the degree of
sunk cost and the magnitude of sunk cost. The impact of sunk cost is modelled in
a “reduced-form" way, meaning that the sunk cost will only aﬀect the likelihood
of attending the gym, but not the consumer’s utility. The sunk cost eﬀect can
be apparently modelled by mental accounting: when the consumer incurred the
sunk cost but does not use the gym, she may experience negative feelings, which
would increase the likelihood of the consumption. Other work has been trying to
endogenize the sunk cost fallacy stemming from reputation building (Kanodia
et al., 1989; McAfee et al., 2010) and limited memory Baliga and Ely (2011).
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Third, our current model does not allow us to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the
price contract in practice. The consumer’s preference needs to be recovered so
that researchers can simulate the outcomes for diﬀerent contracts. The future
work can develop a dynamic structural model and use field data to estimate the
parameters on the sunk cost fallacy and the time-inconsistency. The calibrated
model will enable researchers to evaluate diﬀerent contracts. Our analytical




Mechanisms in Heterogeneous Populations
2.1 Introduction
A core question in every society is how to design social mechanisms so that
they reinforce distributive norms and promote prosocial behavior (Ostrom, 1990).
Numerous field observations have documented how self-organized institutions can
solve collective action problems, reduce poverty, and promote justice, all of which
are of central interest to social and biological scientists (Boyd and Richerson,
2002; Nowak, 2013).
Two major factors have been identified in theoretical and field studies as important
determinants of a society’s ability to enforce distributive norms: (i) the types
of individuals interacting in the society, broadly categorized as selfish or other-
regarding (Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban and
Houser, 2005), and (ii) the types of mechanisms used to promote equity and other
just outcomes, varying between those that punish individuals who act selfishly,
and those that help individuals harmed by the selfish actions of others (Dawes
et al., 2007). A simple way to demonstrate the impact of such mechanisms on
social justice outcomes is to study third-party games (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004), which capture how an impartial third-party responds when one individual
treats another unfairly. In a sanctioning mechanism like a consumer boycott
campaign, the third-party punishes the norm-violator by reducing the violator’s
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material payoﬀs, whereas in a subsidy mechanism like a charity organization, the
third-party helps the victim by increasing the victim’s well-being.
Evidence for the determinative nature of these factors has largely come from two
sources. First, in field and laboratory studies, substantial evidence exists that
variations in mechanism have a significant impact on the mean level of norm-
compliance and the stability of compliance across diﬀerent populations (Gürerk
et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1990). Second, even in controlled laboratory conditions,
there is surprising variation in the level of norm-compliance observed across
groups, ranging from extremely high to extremely low, even under relatively
homogeneous conditions (Fischbacher et al., 2001). This suggests the existence
of unobserved heterogeneity in the composition of the participants.
Surprisingly, despite the importance ascribed to ‘punish’ and ‘help’ mechanisms,
there is little direct evidence documenting conditions in which one mechanism
outperforms the other, and how heterogeneity in the population aﬀects this
comparison. It is also unclear which types of individuals drive reductions in social
injustice and how this reduction might vary across mechanisms. One widely
discussed account on the superiority of ‘punish’ mechanisms shows that reducing
the attractiveness of selfish behavior promotes cooperation. For example, in
public goods games, allowing for the possibility of punishment produces a strong
tendency towards cooperation (Gächter et al., 2008; Gürerk et al., 2006).
More broadly, existing approaches are limited by challenges related to (i) isolating
the eﬀects of social mechanisms on norm-enforcement, and (ii) characterizing
types of individuals in terms of other-regarding concerns that are not directly
observable. Although field evidence has been invaluable in demonstrating the
importance of social mechanisms, isolating how the various types of individuals
shape norm-enforcement in the field is extremely diﬃcult, if not impossible. It is
even more diﬃcult to assess the eﬀects of interactions between types of social
mechanisms and types of individuals using field evidence because mechanisms
tend to continue evolving over time (Henrich, 2006; Gürerk et al., 2006).
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These are not issues in a controlled laboratory setting, where we can observe
behavior at the individual level and statistically quantify types of individuals
using a latent class approach (Bruhin et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 2002). Unlike
approaches that use random eﬀects or individual-level estimations where indi-
vidual diﬀerences are distributed along a continuum, latent class models assume
that the population is composed of discrete classes of individuals, mirroring the
notion of ‘types’ frequently invoked in theoretical and agent-based simulations
(Heckman and Singer, 1984). Furthermore, once individual types are statistically
calibrated using experimental data, simulations can then be performed, just like
in agent-based simulations, to generate new insights (Bowles and Gintis, 2004;
Janssen and Ostrom, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). By combining laboratory
games with latent class modeling, we can characterize the interactions between
types of individuals, the social mechanisms used, and the consequences of this
interaction on norm-compliance and social justice. In this paper, we focus on two
social mechanisms that are pervasive in human societies in enforcing a distributive
norm: (i) punishing norm-violators and (ii) helping poorer individuals (Figure
2.1.A).
The Third-Party Game We studied the behavior of subjects in two types of
three-person games - the third-party punishment game and the third-party help
game - which capture the interactions between types of social mechanisms and
types of individuals. Each game involves three players - a dictator (D), a recipient
(R), and a third-party (TP). In both games, D is given an endowment of 100
monetary units (MU), which D can share with R in any proportion. After the
units are shared, D’s decision is revealed to TP, who is endowed with 120 MU. In
the punishment game, TP must decide whether or not to spend 10 MU to punish
D by 40 MU, whereas in the help game, TP must decide whether to spend 10
MU to help R by 40 MU (Figure 2.1.B).
One important feature of the games is that other-regarding actions are taken
by D and TP on a voluntary basis rather than because of formal mechanisms.
Standard game theory predicts that D will not distribute any proportion to R
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Figure 2.1: The Social Mechanisms, Experimental Paradigm, and Interaction
between Types
Notes: A. Social Mechanisms - Two mechanisms (‘punish’ and ‘help’) are studied. Within
each one, we consider social outcomes to be determined by interactions between heterogeneous
types of individuals. B. Experimental Paradigms - D is endowed with 100 MU. In Stage
1, D must decide how much to give to R. This is observed by TP, who is endowed with 120
MU. In Stage 2, under the ‘punish’ condition (top), TP can punish D by 40 MU at the cost
to TP of 10 MU; under the ‘help’ condition (bottom), TP can give 40 MU to R at the cost to
TP of 10 MU. This is repeated for 20 rounds. C. Interaction between Types - We consider
two types (SF and OR) in two roles (D and TP). The proportion of ORDs in the population is
denoted by ✓ 2 [0, 1], where the remaining 1  ✓ are SFD. Similarly, the proportion of ORTP
is ✓ 2 [0, 1]. This results in four types of interactions: (SFD, SFTP); (SFD, ORTP); (ORD,
SFTP); and (ORD, ORTP).
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and that TP will neither punish D nor help R. Another feature of the game is
that unlike the prisoner’s dilemma game, other-regarding actions do not lead
to Pareto improvement. In the punishment game, TP’s other-regarding actions
are driven by egalitarianism, whereas in the help game, other-regarding motives
are driven by both egalitarianism and social welfare eﬃciency concerns, which
potentially provide a stronger incentive for TP to take the other-regarding action
(Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dawes et al., 2007; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
Note that, by design, TP’s other regarding action always reduces the diﬀerence
in payoﬀs between D and R by the same amount (i.e., 40 MU) independent of
the social mechanism.
The reduction in inequity consists of two components - D’s norm-compliance and
TP’s inequity reduction. The initial inequity is 100 MU, which is the diﬀerence
in endowment between D and R. D’s norm-compliance can reduce inequity at
the outset; the inequity can then be further reduced by TP. Our focus is on final
inequity, which is the outcome of the interactions between D and TP.
We designed the experiment with the following considerations: (i) TP’s payoﬀ is
always higher than that of D and R. This is done to control social comparisons
with the other players in the triplet. This means that TP’s motivation is induced
purely from a sense of social justice rather than jealousy or envy. (ii) Since we
were interested in comparing the impact of diﬀerent social mechanisms on social
inequity, to make the mechanism exogenously determined, we did not oﬀer TP
the option to choose between punishing D and helping R. (iii) We adopted a
repeated game with fixed matching protocol because we are studying a social
setting with complete information where each party learns if the others are selfish
or other-regarding after each play. Since moves are sequential and no additional
motivation is provided for cooperation, the end-game eﬀect is minimal.
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2.2 Experimental Method
Procedure A total of 300 subjects participated in our study at the laboratory
of the Center for Behavioral Economics at the National University of Singapore.
Subjects were recruited via advertisements posted on the university’s online
course management system, and came from all fields of study at NUS. They
received a show-up fee of $4 plus payments that were tied to decisions they made
during the experiment. On average, subjects made approximately $15.70 in cash.
Upon arrival at the lab, each participant was randomly assigned a number that
determined where he or she sat and his or her role (D, R, or TP). Subjects stayed
in the same role throughout the experiment. The experiment was conducted
online. Once everyone had successfully logged in to a specifically designed online
system, the instructions appeared onscreen. The instructions (reproduced in
appendix “Instructions”) were read aloud to ensure that all participants knew
of the procedures and payoﬀs. The participants could only communicate via
the system and they were separated by dividers to ensure anonymity. Each
experimental session lasted for twenty rounds. The same triplet of subjects made
decisions for ten rounds, after which they were randomly matched with other
subjects playing the other two roles for another ten rounds. We conducted sixteen
experimental sessions with 300 participants in total (mean age = 21.6, SD =
2.3; 48% female). Each experimental session lasted about an hour and a half.
Subjects were paid in cash before they left the laboratory.
Design The experimental setup was based on Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)’s
third-party punishment game. We studied third-party responses to violations of
a distributional norm under two experimental conditions - ‘punish’ and ‘help’ -
in a between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
roles - D (red), R (blue), or TP (green) - forming a triplet with one of each role.
Each condition comprised 150 participants in 50 triplets.
In the first stage, D decided how to split a stake of 100 MU with R. R must
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accept any amount allocated by D. TP was endowed with 120 MU and could
either keep the endowment or take an action to reduce inequity at a cost of 10
MU. Under the ‘punish’ condition, if TP decided to reduce inequity, 40 MU was
deducted from D’s payoﬀ. Under the ‘help’ condition, TP could reduce inequity
by giving 40 MU to R.
We designed the experiment according to the fixed matching protocol. Each
session consisted of 20 rounds in total. Participants underwent the decision
making tasks repeatedly with the same triplet of players for ten rounds, after
which they were randomly re-matched with players of the other two roles for
another ten rounds.
2.3 Model-Free Results
Figure 2.2.A and Figure 2.2.B show that there is a persistent diﬀerence in D’s
giving and TP’s inequity reduction between the two conditions and throughout
the rounds. On average, D gave 13.07 MU (SE = 0.54) under the ‘punish’
condition and 7.12 MU (SE = 0.45) under the ‘help’ condition. The diﬀerence
is significant at the 0.05 level using a t-test (t(1998) = 8.45, p < 0.001). TP
reduced inequity at a rate of 33% (SE = 0.15) under the ‘punish’ condition and
45% (SE = 0.16) under the ‘help’ condition.
To determine whether the diﬀerence in TP’s responses in the two conditions could
be attributed to the diﬀerence in D’s giving, we ran a binary logistic regression
analysis in STATA 12, which is shown in Table 2.1; standard errors of the mean
are in parentheses. From the regression analysis, we found that the likelihood of
reducing inequity decreases with the amount given, meaning that the more D
gave, the less likely that TP would reduce inequity. Controlling for giving, TP is
more likely to reduce inequity under the ‘help’ condition (p < .001).
Figure 2.2.C shows the mean frequency of TP’s inequity reduction. On average,
TP chose to reduce inequity more under the ‘help’ condition. Logistic regression
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Model 1 Model 2
Dictator’s Giving -0.015 -0.026
(0.003) (0.005)
‘help’ Dummy 0.45 0.247
(0.094) (0.11)




No. of Observation 2000 2000
Log Likelihood -1309.33 -1303.5
 2 54.52 66.18
Notes: Dependent variable is TP’s response. It is ‘1’ if TP takes justice action, otherwise
‘0’. All coeﬃcients are significant at p < .001 level. Standard errors presented in
parentheses.
Table 2.1: Logistic Regression Analysis of TP’s Response
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of Third-Party Action, Norm Compliant Allocation, and
Inequity Reduction
Notes: C. Mean Frequency of Inequity Reduction by TP (±SEM) - TP is more likely
to reduce inequity under the ‘help’ condition, controlling for what D gives (p < 0.001). D.
Average Norm-Compliance by D (±SEM) - D gives significantly more under the ‘punish’
condition than the ‘help’ one (p < 0.001). E. Total Inequity Reduction, by Mechanism
(±SEM) - The ‘punish’ condition reduces more inequity ex post inequity (p < 0.001).
analysis further confirms that TP implemented inequity reduction depending on
what D gave. Not surprisingly, D was more norm-compliant and gave more under
the ‘punish’ condition (Figure 2.2.D). Total inequity reduction was determined
by D’s norm-compliance and the likelihood of TP’s inequity reduction. Figure
2.2.E shows that although TP was more likely to reduce inequity under the ‘help’
condition, it was actually the ‘punish’ condition that led to a more equitable
outcome. Put diﬀerently, the ‘punish’ mechanism is superior to the ‘help’ mecha-




These results emphasize the importance of the interaction between D and TP
in diﬀerent social mechanisms. However, the aggregate results do not account
for the possibility that the outcome actually emerged based on the interaction
between diﬀerent types of individuals within a mechanism. It is also unknown
how the outcome will change if the composition of individual types changes across
societies and over time.
Arguably, in the ‘help’ mechanism, the greater the number of other-regarding
TPs, the greater the reduction in social inequity. In such a scenario, even if D is
other-regarding, he or she may wish to free-ride and will reduce the amount given
to R knowing that TP will act to reduce inequity. As a result, the superiority
of the ‘help’ mechanism depends on the proportion of other-regarding Ds in the
population. Similarly, in the ‘punish’ mechanism, the greater the proportion of
other-regarding TPs, the greater the reduction in inequity. In this scenario, even
if D is selfish, he or she may be forced to behave as other-regarding in order
to avoid being punished, decreasing ex ante inequity. Substantial field evidence
suggests an alternative where the eﬀectiveness of a social mechanism depends
upon the relative composition of diﬀerent types of individuals whose behavior
depends upon the type of social mechanism used (Ostrom, 1990; Varughese and
Ostrom, 2001).
To investigate the interaction between social mechanisms and the heterogeneity of
types, we have to provide a benchmark to understand the degree of heterogeneity
in the population in characterizing ‘punish’ and ‘help’ behavior. This requires a
model that simultaneously accounts for (i) the interaction between the decisions
made by D and TP, (ii) the eﬀects of diﬀerent social mechanisms, and (iii) the
existence of diﬀerent types of D and TP.
We simplified the population into a mixture of two types of D and TP - selfish
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dictator (SFD) and other-regarding dictator (ORD), and selfish third-party
(SFTP) and other-regarding third-party (ORTP) (Figure 2.1.C). One key insight
from agent-based simulations is that the emergence of certain outcomes is sensitive
to the fractions of types in the population and which types interacted, suggesting
that a social mechanism must take heterogeneity of types into account in order
to promote social justice. For example, consider SFD and ORD interacting with
ORTP. SFD would presumably exhibit more norm-compliance in the ‘punish’
mechanism than the ‘help’ one. However, if TP is more likely to reduce inequity
in the ‘help’ mechanism, determining which mechanism is more eﬀective depends
on whether D’s norm-compliance or TP’s inequity reduction causes a greater
reduction in inequity.
We used an inequity-aversion model (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) in which individuals make tradeoﬀs between their own monetary payoﬀs
and inequity. In this model, selfish individuals only maximize their monetary
payoﬀ, while other-regarding individuals also consider inequity. In addition to
concerns of inequity between D and R, an ORTP also considers the eﬃciency
of the social mechanism. Using latent class modeling, we estimated the relative
proportions of the two types of individuals - selfish or other-regarding - as well
as the degree of the latter.
Third-Party Utility TP’s utility is modeled in the spirit of Charness and Rabin
(2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). TP is endowed with ⇡tp, and is deciding
whether to incur cost c to restore the justice. In the ‘punish’ condition, the justice
action will reduce D’s payoﬀ by l, whereas in the ‘help’ condition, the action will
augment R’s payoﬀ by l. Besides her own monetary payoﬀ, the other-regarding
TP cares about the payoﬀ diﬀerence - inequity between the D and R, as well
as eﬃciency - the total final payoﬀ of the three parties. We add this eﬃciency
concern to capture the fact that conditional on D giving x 2 {0, 1, ...,⇡d}, TP is
more likely to reduce inequity under the ‘help’ condition. We use two parameters
(↵tp,tp) to capture TP’s degree of inequity aversion and eﬃciency concern.
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Hence, given D’s giving x, TP’s utility under the punish’ condition is:
Utp(d|x,↵tp,tp) =
8>><>>:
⇡tp   ↵tp ·max{⇡d   2x, 0}, if j = 0
⇡tp   c  ↵tp ·max{⇡d   2x  l, 0}  tp · l, if j = 1
(2.1)
The utility under the ‘help’ condition is:
Utp(d|x,↵tp,tp) =
8>><>>:
⇡tp   ↵tp ·max{⇡d   2x, 0}, if j = 0
⇡tp   c  ↵tp ·max{⇡d   2x  l, 0}+ tp · l, if j = 1
(2.2)
Dictator Utility We denote P (d = 1|x,↵tp,tp) as the probability that TP
will reduce inequity conditional on giving x and TP’s other-regarding preference
(↵tp,tp). Hence P (d = 0|x,↵tp,tp) = 1  P (d = 1|x,↵tp,tp) is the probability
that TP does not reduce inequity. V (x|d,↵d) is D’s ex post utility by giving x
after TP’s decision d. We assume that D only has inequity concerns ↵d1. Under
the ‘punish’ condition, the ex post utility is defined as:
V (x|d,↵d) =
8>><>>:
⇡d   x  ↵d ·max{⇡d   2x, 0}, if d = 0
⇡d   x  l   ↵d ·max{⇡d   2x  l, 0}, if d = 1
(2.3)
Under the ‘help’ condition, the ex post utility is defined as:
V (x|d,↵d) =
8>><>>:
⇡d   x  ↵d ·max{⇡d   2x, 0}, if d = 0
⇡d   x  ↵d ·max{⇡d   2x  l, 0}, if d = 1
(2.4)
As a result, D’s expected utility for giving x is defined as:
EU(x|↵d) = P (d = 1) · V (x|d = 1,↵d) + P (d = 0) · V (x|d = 0,↵d) (2.5)
1D’s role is to decide how much money to allocate to the recipient, so we believe D’s
consideration is less likely to be aﬀected by social eﬃciency. More importantly, under the
‘punish’ condition, punishment reduces D’s payoﬀ, as well as inequity and eﬃciency. It is not
distinguishable which one is the concern for D. As a result, we assume d = 0 for D.
54
We assume that D has rational expectation of probability P (d = 1).
2.4.2 Discrete Choice Modeling
To econometrically calibrate the parameters in the utility functions, we add an
independent and identically distributed extreme value error term, ✏it, to utilities
in equation 2.1, 2.2 and 2.5, representing the components in the utility that are
unobserved by the researcher. Then we have a logit specification of the choice
probability that is consistent with utility maximization (McFadden, 1974). As a
result, TP’s choice probability of choosing strategy d conditional on giving x is:
P (d|x,↵tp,tp) = exp(  · U(d|x,↵tp,tp))P1
d0=0 exp(  · U(d0|x,↵tp,tp))
(2.6)
The D’s choice probability of giving x is:
P (x|↵d) = exp(  · U(x|↵d))P⇡d
x0=0 exp(  · U(x0|↵d))
(2.7)
Mixture Modeling We assume that there are two types of individuals (s = 1, 2)
in the population who have heterogeneous preferences over the payoﬀs of others
. The index s denotes whether the individual has high level of other-regarding
preference (s = 1) or low level of other-regarding (s = 2, , more selfish) 2.
Specifically, one segment of dictators are other-regarding (↵1d   0) and the
remainders are purely selfish(↵2d = 0). For the third party, one segment are
other-regarding(↵1tp   0,1tp   0), and the remainders selfish (↵2tp = 0,2tp = 0).
The size of the other-regarding type is ✓ (0  ✓  0). Since we assume rational
expectation in the model, Dictator knows the likelihood of being punished (or
the likelihood that TP will help).
2We estimated the model with three types of individuals, two segments are other-regarding
but with diﬀerent degrees, and the remaining segment is purely selfish. We did find improvement
in terms of model fitness indicated by likelihood and Akaike’s Information Criterion. We assume
two segment model is just to mimic the work in agent-based modeling and simplify the theoretic
discussion
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TP’s choice probability conditional on the giving x is:





d0=0 exp(  · U(d0|x,↵1tp,1tp))





d0=0 exp(  · U(d0|x,↵2tp,2tp))
  is a parameter capturing sensitivity of the choices to utility diﬀerences. When
  = 0, the individual is completely insensitive to the diﬀerences in utilities, and
the model would predict the individual will choose each alternative with equal
probability. When  !1, the probability of choosing the alternative with higher
utility would approach one. We estimate   from the data.
D’s choice probability conditional is:
P (x) = ✓ · exp(  · U(d|↵
1
d))P⇡d
x0=0 exp(  · U(x0|↵1d))
+ (1  ✓) · exp(  · U(d|↵
2
d))P⇡d
x0=0 exp(  · U(x0|↵2d))
Define dictator i’s choice history as Hi = xit, t = 1, 2, ..., T , the likelihood of this
subject’s choice history can be computed as:








I[xit = x] is the indicator function which is 1 if xit = x, and otherwise 0. Then





Define TP j’s choice history as Gj = djt, t = 1, 2, ..., T . Using the same procedure,
we can obtain the likelihood for TP’s choice Ltp. We maximize the logged
likelihood log(Ld · Ltp) over the parameters (↵1d,↵1tp,1tp, , ✓). The estimation
was performed using OPTIMUM package in GAUSS 13. The standard errors
of the coeﬃcients were calculated using Delta method (Wooldridge, 2010). To
mitigate local maxima problem, we randomly chose 50 sets of initial values to
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broaden the search region.
2.4.3 Calibration Results
Table 2.2 presents the calibration results. we calibrated three model specifications.
In Model I, we assume all the players are purely selfish. The payoﬀ sensitivity
is positive and significant, indicating that the subjects cares about monetary
incentive. In Model II, we incorporates other-regarding which nests Model I as a
special case. The coeﬃcients reveal a representative player’s preference. As can
be seen, the inequity-aversion parameter for TP is positive but for D is zero. In
Model III, we collapsed the players into two types, selfish and other-regarding,
and estimated the proportion of other-regarding type in the population. Model
III has significantly better fitness than Model I and Model II (reported as  2 from
the likelihood ratio test). Model III - the mixture model, increases the likelihood
by 10% compared to Model II. When we take heterogeneity into account, in
the other-regarding segment, the parameter for inequity-aversion is positive and
significant for both TP and D.
2.4.4 Simulation Studies
Conditions under Which ‘Punish’ Outperforms ‘Help’ Using the cali-
brated model, we performed two sets of simulations. We first simulated four
types of interactions, illustrated in Figure 2.1.C, which serve as extreme cases
where individual types are either selfish or other-regarding. Second, we changed
the proportion of other-regarding individuals to examine the boundary conditions
under which one social mechanism might be superior to another.
Figure 2.3.A presents the simulated results for norm-compliance. Comparing
the top-left and bottom-left cells, ORD is more norm-compliant and gives more
to R than SFD. When examining the impact of social mechanism (‘Punish’
or ‘help’) on D (top-left and top-right cells), we notice that SFD is non-norm-
compliant independent of mechanism, giving the same low amount (4%) to R when
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Model I Model II Model III
Purely Selfish Other-Regarding Mixture
Dictator’s Inequity Aversion (↵d) - 0 0.4129
- (0) (0.0052)
TP’s Inequity Aversion (↵tp) - 0.177 0.3138
- (0.0119) (0.0076)
TP’s Eﬃciency Concern (tp) - 0.0559 0.033
(0.0114) (0.0068)
Payoﬀ Sensitivity ( ) 8.6675 10.0691 25.0793
(0.1812) (0.2418) (0.9085)
Prop. of Other Regarding (✓) - - 0.3247
- - (0.012)
LL -8103.4906 -8005.5417 -7156.074
 2 - 195.8978 1894.833
# of Obs 4000 4000 4000
Table 2.2: Calibration Results
interacting with both SFTP and ORTP. However, there is a striking diﬀerence in
ORD’s norm-compliance in the interaction between social mechanism and the
type of TP (bottom-left and bottom-right cells). Under the ‘Punish’ condition,
ORD behaves significantly more norm-compliant in the presence of ORTP, giving
34%, which is twice as much as when SFTP is present (17%) under the same
condition. Under the ‘help’ condition, when ORD is interacting with ORTP, we
observe a 3.46% reduction (17% to 13%) in giving compared to when interacting
with SFTP, a result of ORD’s free-riding on ORTP being other-regarding, an
interesting phenomenon we call the crowding out eﬀect.
TP’s inequity reduction is shown in Figure 2.3.B. We see that when SFD and
ORTP interacted under the ‘help’ condition (top-right cell), it led to greater
inequity reduction (36%) than under the ‘Punish’ condition (30%). In this
scenario, the threat of punishment did not increase norm-compliance on the
part of D, but it did increase the likelihood of TP reducing inequity. That is,
when the impact of the eﬃciency concern on inequity reduction surpasses that of
norm-compliance caused by punishment, the ‘help’ condition will lead to greater
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inequity reduction than the ‘Punish’ condition. Interestingly, interaction between
ORD and ORTP under the ‘punish’ condition (bottom-right cell) leads to greater
inequity reduction by TP (79%) than under the ‘help’ condition (55%); this is
primarily caused by substantially greater norm-compliance under the ‘punish’
condition.
We further simulated how changes in the proportion of other-regarding individuals
in a society might influence the relative merits of the ‘punish’ and ‘help’ mecha-
nisms. We first observed the proportion of ORDs and ORTPs that are equally
eﬀective in inequity reduction in both mechanisms (Fig. 4). We plotted the
diﬀerence in total inequity reduction between the ‘punish’ and ‘help’ mechanisms
in Figure 2.3.D. As shown, the ‘punish’ mechanism is more eﬀective than the
‘help’ one if the proportion of ORDs and ORTPs is suﬃciently high. When the
proportion of ORDs falls below a certain threshold, the ‘help’ mechanism is more
successful at reducing social inequity.
Reinforcing and Crowding-out Eﬀects of Heterogeneity and Mecha-
nism In Figure 2.3.C, we see how the interaction between diﬀerent types of
individuals aﬀected outcomes, and how they diﬀered by the type of mechanism
used. In particular, we examined inequity reduction (i) by ORD if ORTP is not
present, (ii) by ORTP if ORD is not present, and (iii) when ORD and ORTP are
both present.
Interestingly, we found that ORD and ORTP reduced inequity by similar amounts
under the ‘punish’ and ‘help’ conditions. We also observed a mutually reinforcing
eﬀect in reducing inequity when ORD is paired with ORTP under the ‘punish’
condition. Together, they reduced inequity by 78.52%, which is more than the
sum reduced by ORTP (30.4%) and ORD (33.39%) in isolation. In contrast, due
to the crowding-out eﬀect under the ‘help’ condition, ORTP and ORD together
reduced inequity by less (54.94%) than the sum of the reduction by ORTP
(36.03%) and ORD (33.39%) in isolation.
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Figure 2.3: Norm-Compliance and Inequity Reduction by Mechanism and Type
Notes: A. Norm-Compliance by Mechanism and Type - When ORTP is present under
the ‘punish’ condition (top-right and bottom-right cells), ORD is more compliant than SFD,
giving 34% versus 4%. When SFTP is present in the same condition (top-left and bottom-left
cells), SFD only gives 4%, but ORD gives 17.56%. When ORTP is present under the ‘help’
condition (bottom cells), the crowding out eﬀect is observed and ORD reduces giving by 3.46%
from 17% to 13%, compared to when SFTP is present. Bootstrapped SEMs (replication sample
size = 1,000) are presented together with the mean. B. Inequity Reduction by Mechanism
and Type - With SFD, ORTP (top-right cell) reduces inequity more under the ‘help’ condition
(36%) than the ‘punish’ one (30%). With ORD, ORTP (bottom-right cell) reduces inequity
more under the ‘punish’ condition (79%) than the ‘help’ one (55%). ORTP and ORD reduce a
comparable amount of inequity when matched with a selfish counterpart under both conditions
(top-right and bottom-left cells). Bootstrapped SEMs (replication sample size = 1,000) are
presented together with the mean. C. Inequity Reduction by Mechanism for ORD and
ORTP - There is a mutually reinforcing eﬀect in reducing inequity when ORD is paired with
ORTP under the ‘punish’ condition. Due to the crowding-out eﬀect, under the ‘help’ condition,
ORD and ORTP together reduce inequity by less than the sum reduced by ORTP and ORD
in isolation. D. Diﬀerence in Inequity Reduction between ‘Punish’ and ‘Help’ -
A positive value denotes that the ‘punish’ condition reduces inequity. If the proportion of
other-regarding Ds and TPs is suﬃciently high (the upper-right), the ‘punish’ mechanism is
more eﬀective than the ‘help’ one.
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2.5 Discussion
A considerable number of observations from field studies have documented self-
organized mechanisms being used to solve collective action problems, reduce
poverty and promote justice (Ostrom, 1990; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). By
focusing on voluntary inequity reduction, we show that on average, the ‘pun-
ish’ mechanism leads to a more just outcome than the ‘help’ one, but when
heterogeneous types are considered and the norm-violator is purely selfish, the
‘help’ mechanism is more eﬀective in promoting justice. Our findings are of
particular importance when considering how to design social mechanisms to
reduce inequity in conditions where the eﬀectiveness of the mechanism is sensitive
to the heterogeneity of types in the population.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that when D is selfish, the ‘help’ mechanism
reduces a greater amount of inequity than the ‘punish’ mechanism, but this
should be interpreted with a few caveats. Apparently, when the cost of being
punished is suﬃciently large, SFD may exhibit more norm-compliant behavior.
In our experiment, we set the punishment for SFD as 40 MU, which is 40% of the
total endowment. We conducted more simulations to investigate how inequity
reduction in the two mechanisms would be aﬀected by inequity reduction (what D
will lose and R will gain) at diﬀerent costs to TP; see the Supporting Information
for details. We varied experimental parameters such as consequence and cost
while fixing the parameters for inequity-aversion, eﬃciency concern, and the
proportion of OR-type individuals that is estimated from data. We found that
when the consequences of inequity reduction were suﬃciently large, the ‘punish’
mechanism produced a greater reduction in inequity than the ‘help’ mechanism.
Aside from the ‘punish’ and ‘help’ mechanisms, we also occasionally observe other
mechanisms used to reduce inequity. Besides reducing D’s payoﬀ, TP can transfer
wealth from D to R, like Robin Hood, or reward a norm-compliant D. We have
examined the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent mechanisms when interacting with diﬀerent
types in the population, but how diﬀerent mechanisms endogenously emerge,
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evolve, and shape the behavior of the individuals, remains to be answered. We
aim to systematically examine these questions in future work.
Our combination of experimental data, a latent class model, and simulation
oﬀers a useful tool for understanding the interaction between social mechanisms
and heterogeneous types of individuals. In our framework, all individuals are
utility-maximizers, satisfying their own preferences in diﬀerent social mechanisms.
Our approach successfully uncovers preference in types of individuals and, more
importantly, provides better estimates for preference parameters. Since this
approach can investigate more complex heterogeneities in preference and behavior
(e.g., expected vs. non-expected utility, Bayesian vs. reinforcement learning,
myopic vs. forward-looking, etc.), we believe that it is worthwhile to investigate
the design of social mechanisms in other issues where heterogeneity in risk attitude
and dynamic behavior are key concerns.
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Appendix I: Mathematical Proof
Proof of Proposition 2





(b  c) dc (.0.8)








The monopolistic firm charges the maximum membership fee L subject to the
constraint that E[Ut=0]. Since the membership fee is supposed to be positive,
then the optimal membership fee unique:
L⇤sc =
 (1   )b  1 +p( (1   )b  1)2 +  2(2 b2    2b2)
 2
(.0.9)
For the time-consistent consumer (  = 1), we can easily verify that @L⇤@  < 0.




 2 . Hence the presence
of sunk cost lowers the willingness to pay, and the willingness to pay is decreasing
with the degree of sunk cost eﬀect. Hence proposition 1 (i) follows.
For proposition 1 (ii), when   = 0, for the time-inconsistent consumer, L⇤ =
 b2    2b22 . When   6= 0, according to the property of the quadratic function, if
 (1  )bLnsc   
2L2nsc
2 > 0, then the optimal lump-sum fee Lsc (resulting U
s
sc = 0)
is higher than the case when there is no sunk cost fallacy. As a result, we found
that:










Proof of Proposition 3














( b  p  c) dF (c)
◆
=   u
Given the assumption about the distribution of c, the objective function and
constraint can be re-written as:





   2L2 + 2 ( (1   )b  1)L+ 2 b2   2bp+ p2    2b2  = 0 (.0.11)
If we denote the objective function as f(L, p) and the constraint as g(L, p) = 0.






@p . Hence we obtain the
new equality:
1 +  (p  a)
 b  2p+  L+ a =
 (1   )b   2L  1
p  b (.0.12)
   3L2 +   2 ((1  2 )b+ 2p  a)    L
+ ( (1   )b  1)( b  2p+ a)  (1 +  (p  a))(p  b) = 0 (.0.13)
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(b  a)2(a  b(3  2 ))




(b  a)(3b  2 b  a)
2( (b  a) + 1)2 > 0
Comparing per-visit fee P ⇤ with marginal cost a, we obtain:
p⇤   a =  (b  a)
2   2b(1   )
2 (b  a) + 2
If   = 1, then p⇤   a > 0. If     2b(1  )(b a)2 , then p⇤   a   0. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 4
We now examine the firms profit in equilibrium. First, we observe that consumer’s
expected consumption is not aﬀected by the sunk cost eﬀect in equilibrium. The
consumer will consume if c   b  p⇤ +  L. If we plug the equilibrium contract
.0.14 to the inequality, we obtain c  b  a, which is the same as the case when
there is no time-inconsistency and no sunk cost eﬀect.
We next examine the firm’s profit, which is the same as the benchmark model
(  = 1 and   = 0):




Since in equilibrium, consumer receives zero payoﬀ. As a result, the sunk cost
eﬀect does not aﬀect social welfare in equilibrium. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 5
We now examine how competition would influence the firm’s pricing strategy. In





































(b  a)(1  a+ (1   )b)
( (b  a) + 1)2 > 0
Comparing per-visit fee P ⇤ with marginal cost a, we obtain:
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p⇤   a =  (1   )b
 (b  a) + 1
If   = 1, then p⇤   a = 0. Otherwise p⇤   a < 0. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 7
The naive consumer believes that her future payoﬀ will be discounted by  ˆ and
 ˆ    . As a result, given the lump-sum fee L and per-visit price p her expected
utility according to her subjective belief on   is:









L+ 2 ˆb2   2bp+ p2    ˆ2b2
⌘
(.0.16)
Since her actual expected utility is:




   2L2 + 2 ( (1   )b  1)L+ 2 b2   2bp+ p2    2b2 
(.0.17)
We take the diﬀerence of the two:






2 L+ b( ˆ +     2)
⌘
(.0.18)
The proposition 7 follows when we consider the sign of the equation .0.18. In the
market for investment goods, b > 0. If  ˆ =  , E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] = E[U(L, p, ,  )].
If   < b(2  ˆ  )2L , then E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )] > E[U(L, p, ,  )]. If     b(2  ˆ  )2L , then
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E[U(L, p,  ˆ,  )]   E[U(L, p, ,  )]. The prediction error is monotonically increas-
ing with  




2 L+ b( ˆ +     2)
⌘
< 0. Hence the actual expected utility is always
smaller than the predicted expected utility, and the corollary 3 follows. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 8
The diﬀerence E[U(L, p, ,  )]  E[U(L, p, ,  ˆ)] implies
1
2
 L( ˆ    )[L( ˆ +  )  2(1   )b]
Proposition 8 follows. Q.E.D
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Appendix II: Experimental Instruction
General Instruction
This is an experiment on decision making. The instructions are simple and if you
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash before you leave today.
Diﬀerent subjects may earn diﬀerent amounts of cash. What you earn today
depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on
chance.
There are [3X] subjects in this room. Subjects will be randomly assigned to
one of the three colours: RED, BLUE, or GREEN. Each subject has an equal
chance of playing the role of RED, BLUE and GREEN player. Each subject has
a diﬀerent role and will stay in the same role throughout the entire experiment.
The experiment will consist of [20] decision making rounds. In the beginning of
the 1st round, subjects will be randomly grouped into [X] triplets. Each triplet
consists of one RED player, one BLUE player, and one GREEN player. You will
undergo the decision making tasks repeatedly with the same triplet of players
for [10] rounds. In the beginning of the 11th round, you will be rematched
with completely diﬀerent people of the other two colours based on the random
assignment. You will play the same decision making tasks with the newly formed
triplet for the remaining [10] rounds. The decision making task of each player
will be explained below. The experiment is anonymous. Specifically, you do not
know (and will not know) who the players are in your triplet. Similarly, the other
players of your triplet do not know (and will not know) who you are.
It is important that you do not look at the decisions of others, and that you do
not talk, laugh, or make noises during the experiment. You will be warned if you
violate this rule. If you violate this rule twice, you will be asked to leave, and
you will not be paid. That is, your earnings will be $0.
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Experimental Procedure
In each round, the decision making task occurs in 2 stages, namely, I and II. Each
colored player undertakes its respective task as follows:
Stage I:
In Stage I, RED will have a pot of 100 cents to divide between herself and BLUE
player. RED can divide the pot of 100 cents in any way she pleases (giving BLUE
player any amount ranging from 0 to 100 cents). BLUE player gets the division
from RED player no matter what it is. For example, if RED decides to give BLUE
10 cents, then RED will earn 100-10 = 90 cents and BLUE will earn 10 cents.
Similarly, if RED gives BLUE 90 cents, then RED will earn 100-90=10 cents and
BLUE will earn 90 cents. Note that these numbers are chosen arbitrarily for
illustrative purposes only. GREEN player will merely observe the RED player’s
division of the pot of 100 cents in Stage I.
Stage II:
[PUNISH Condition]
GREEN player will be given a pot of 120 cents. GREEN player must decide
whether or not to pay 10 cents to subtract 40 cents from RED player’s earning
in Stage I.
1. If GREEN player decides to pay 10 cents to subtract 40 cents from RED
player’s earning in Stage I, then GREEN player will earn 110 cents and
RED player’s earning in Stage I will be reduced by 40 cents.
2. If GREEN player decides not to pay 10 cents to subtract cash from RED
player’s earning in Stage I, GREEN will earn 120 cents and RED player’s
earning in Stage I will remain the same.
3. BLUE player’s earning in Stage I stays the same.
[HELP Condition]
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GREEN player will be given a pot of 120 cents. GREEN player must decide
whether or not to pay 10 cents to add 40 cents to BLUE player’s earning.
1. If GREEN player decides to pay 10 cents to add 40 cents to BLUE player’s
earning, then GREEN player will earn 110 cents and BLUE player’s earning
in Stage I earning will be increased by 40 cents.
2. If GREEN player decides not to pay 10 cents to add cash to BLUE player’s
earning, GREEN will earn 120 cents and BLUE player’s earning in Stage I
will remain the same.
3. RED player’s earning in Stage I stays the same.
In each round, Players will be informed of their respective decision outcomes and
cash earnings after Stage II. The above decision task is repeated for 20 rounds,
during which [X] triplets will be formed twice. Each player will be matched
with 2 other players of diﬀerent colors in the beginning of the 1st and 11th
round. Within the first 10 rounds and remaining 10 rounds, each player knows
the decisions of 2 other players in previous rounds. Importantly, the information
about decisions in round 1 to round 10 will not be revealed to the other matched
players in round 11 to 20.
Payoﬀs
Your dollar earnings for the experiments are determined as follows. First, we will
sum up your total dollar earnings from all 20 rounds. In addition, we will add
a $5 show-up fee to this amount. You will be paid the total amount when you
leave the experiment.
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